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ABSTRACT

Designed to accompany a 4-part video series, this high school unit on U.S.-Soviet relations focuses on each nation's world view, political system, and ideologies. A student handbook and teacher's curriculum guide are included. The student handbook is divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 examines the political and economic system of each country as well as geographic influences on each nation's foreign policy. Chapter 2 puts the current U.S.-Soviet relationship into perspective by examining its evolution. The American-Soviet arms race is highlighted in chapter 3. The final chapter focuses on future relations between the two superpowers. Each chapter contains a section of ideas to guide student reading, a reading selection, excerpts from relevant speeches or news articles, and a chapter summary. Chapters are illustrated with photos, charts, and maps. The student handbook concludes with a 1-page list of references and a glossary. The teacher's curriculum guide describes each chapter of the student handbook and the relationship of this written information to the video series. Also included are suggestions for using video materials in the classroom and specific strategies for teaching and expanding the student readings. Procedures for student simulations and activities such as a debate and a futures wheel are described. (LP)

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# Close Up Special Focus:
# U.S.-Soviet Relations

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**Executive Editor**
Patricia Bandy

**Assistant Editor for Academic Publications**
Jacqueline Hess

**Production and Design**
Janine Ward

**Editorial Staff**
Steven Waxman, R. Parker Harrington,
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The Special Focus series consists of a publication, four televised seminars with documentary segments, and a curriculum guide. The seminars feature high school participants in the Washington program questioning key policymakers in lively discussions about important issues. The televised portion of the package is funded by **Conoco Inc.** and **R.J.Reynolds Industries, Inc.** The Close Up Foundation has produced three such series: *Special Focus on the Economy, Special Focus on Energy,* and *Special Focus: U.S.-Soviet Relations.*

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## Close Up Special Focus:

# U.S.-Soviet Relations

**Written by Jacqueline Hess**

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# Acknowledgments

U.S.-Soviet relations is a very difficult subject to explore objectively because emotion so often clouds even seemingly objective facts. Just as perception and misperception play a role in the relationship itself, they play just as large a role in academic attempts to unravel the relationship. The following people have made this book possible by reviewing portions of the manuscript and making important suggestions concerning its factual content and objectivity. Not all of the reviewers agree with all of the points made in the book, nor are they responsible for any factual errors. The editors wish to thank the following for their time and effort: Richard Koskella, International Planning and Analysis Center; Dr. Nancy Lubin, Office of Technology Assessment; Mary McDermott and Michael McDermott, Robinson High School students; Warren Milberg, defense analyst; Professor Sharon Wolchik, Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies.

# Introduction

Discussions of U.S.-Soviet relations usually focus on ideological conflict: capitalism versus communism, democracy versus totalitarianism, good versus bad. The ideological differences between the United States and the Soviet Union are in fact great ones and are important to understand. But the competing ideologies are only part of the story.

To more fully understand the problem-ridden U.S.-Soviet relationship, we must try to learn what guides each nation's actions in the world and with each other. To do that, we must consider how each views the world. We also need to study each nation's political system and its decision-making process in order to understand its values and the way it translates its values into policy.

In the first section of *Special Focus: U.S.-Soviet Relations,* we will look at the political and economic systems that each is committed to preserving. We will also examine the geographic considerations that influence the foreign policy of the United States and the Soviet Union.

In the second chapter we will put the current U.S.-Soviet relationship into perspective by examining its evolution.

The third chapter will highlight the issue that causes the most friction between the superpowers and yet the issue on which it is vitally important that they reach some accord: the spiraling arms race.

Finally, we will look to the future in an effort to understand the potential that exists for both conflict and cooperation.

# Differing World Views

## IDEAS TO CONSIDER WHILE YOU READ

- How do the economic systems of capitalism and communism treat the following?
  - (a) private ownership of property
  - (b) the role of government in a nation's economy
- Does the United States have a purely capitalist system? Does the Soviet Union have a purely communist system?
- What is the difference between socialism and communism?
- Do the economies of the United States and the Soviet Union have anything in common?
- How do each of the following affect a country's strength and its sense of being secure from invasion?
  - (a) its size
  - (b) the size of its population
  - (c) the number of foreign countries it borders
  - (d) its natural resources
  - (e) solidarity among its people
- Why does a nation need a political system?
- What are the strengths and weaknesses of the American political system? What are the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet political system?
- What, if anything, do the U.S. and Soviet political systems have in common? How are they different?
- What role does the Communist party play in Soviet society?
- How is the Communist party different from political parties in the United States?

Americans and Soviets focus more on the difference between the economic systems of their nations than on any other factor. Americans, in fact, often think of communism as a type of government rather than as a type of economic system.

There is a school of thought that believes that a nation's economic principles determine its political, social, and cultural orientation. These people are called *economic determinists*. Karl Marx was an economic determinist because he believed that a fundamental change in a nation's economic structure (such as a change from capitalism to socialism) would bring with it a restructuring of that nation's society in all other spheres.

Although the Soviet Union's government is totalitarian, other nations have combined a socialist economy with different types of government. In the Scandinavian countries, for instance, the economies are socialist, but the governments are democratic.

Many people today believe that pure socialism and pure capitalism do not exist. (Everyone agrees that no nation has successfully achieved a purely communist system.) In the Soviet Union, capitalist incentives have been introduced, such as farmers' being allowed to work private plots for personal profit and factory workers' being given merit raises for particularly productive work. Likewise, the United States has adopted certain socialist values, such as the responsibility of the government to provide medical care for the old (Medicare) and the poor (Medicaid). The U.S. government also subsidizes private enterprise by providing tax incentives for activities it wishes to encourage, such as exploration for energy reserves.

Although there are shared elements in the economic systems of the United States and the Soviet Union, their differences still remain paramount. The economic system of the Soviet Union was consciously adopted, initially by a small group of people, and implemented by a centralized leadership that succeeded (at great human cost) in pulling the economy of the Soviet Union from its still largely feudal state at the beginning of the twentieth century to that of a modern, industrial nation a mere sixty-five years later. The economy of the United States, on the other hand, developed gradually, and individuals, not the government, were responsible for the shape of it.

Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are tied to the differences in their economies. Both nations believe their way to be superior. Both fear and denounce the abuses that the other's system seems to perpetrate on its citizens. Americans point to the lack of personal freedom allowed Soviet citizens as critically as Soviets point to the extreme poverty of many Americans living in the richest country in the world.

This section examines the development of communism and capitalism and helps to explain how far apart are the fundamental concepts underlying each.

## Capitalism

After the fall of the Roman empire, with its centralized government and highly developed civilization, the nations in the area that is now Western Europe and Russia were plunged into a period of chaos and violence. In response to the need to protect themselves from repeated invasions from the Vikings in the North and the Mongols in the East, these early Europeans developed a complex system of mutual protection that grew into the system of feudalism.

The feudal system was one in which the welfare of the community was all-important. The role of the church in feudal society was central. Most people were peasants who worked the land; their lives were rigidly structured by religious rite and by the needs of the land. Individual prosperity was not a goal for the peasants. Instead, they had a sense of being part of an organic community, of a universal Christian society that existed across the continent of Europe. In accordance with this view, prices charged for goods and services were regulated by a central religious authority interested in maintaining stability in the community, not in making the producers of the goods and services rich.

Such a system was not amenable to the development of capitalism, with its emphasis on economic self-interest. Before capitalism could flourish, civilization had to undergo change of great magnitude. And, over a period of seven hundred years, it did just that.

The major transformations that allowed capitalism to develop in Europe were:

- the emergence of the nation state
- scientific and industrial development
- development of Protestant sects within Christianity
- the secularization of society.

These societal transformations began slowly at first, and then proceeded with accelerating speed. They became increasingly interconnected and supportive of each other. For instance, the Protestant Reformation broke the monolithic hold that the church had over people's lives. As different Protestant sects developed, challenging each other and the central religious hierarchy in Rome, two things happened: society began to develop a religious tolerance for differing sects and the central authority of the church began to decrease. Both of these developments had a secularizing effect on society. Some scholars find in early Protestantism the roots of capitalism. They suggest that, with its emphasis on the individual rather than on the group, and in some sects the belief that economic prosperity is an indication of spiritual favor, Protestantism encouraged the capitalist concept of economic self-interest to grow.

As the central authority of the church diminished, kings and other secular leaders were able to secure greater power of their own. They increased their territory and their authority, and started to take responsibility for establishing transportation networks, uniform systems of weights and money, and a uniform legal code. These developments in turn encouraged the growth of trade and the building of towns. The idea of a universal Christian European community began to be replaced by the movement toward national unity. Although there was still some element of decentralized aristocratic control, the movement toward centralized governmental authority, in the person of a king or queen, became firmly established.

As an island separated from mainland Europe, England began to develop a national consciousness as early as the eleventh century. Over a period of several centuries, others followed suit. National borders tended to follow ethnic and linguistic divisions between people. In those areas where states came to encompass differing ethnic groups (like the Soviet Union), a sense of national unity has been somewhat harder to achieve.

A gradual separation of church and state became apparent. The long buried concerns of the Roman empire—science, art, literature, and philosophy—once again surfaced. Scientific discovery and industrial development became the marks of a new era, the Renaissance (meaning "rebirth"). As industry grew, so did the population of the towns, or urban areas. A pool of urban labor became available for the further development of industrial enterprise. The social classes of the aristocracy and the peasantry were replaced by an industrial middle and working class. No longer were prices and commerce regulated by the church. The role of the increasingly secular state in economic affairs was limited to the protection of the property rights of the growing class of capitalist entrepreneurs. Apart from that, the state was expected to keep its hands out of business. This concept was known as "laissez-faire capitalism." Such economic decisions as the level of prices and wages were to be set not with regard to the organic needs of the community as before, but rather with regard to the available supply of a particular commodity, including labor, and the demand for that commodity.

The theory of "laissez-faire capitalism" and the central role to be played by the "law" of supply and demand were best described by Scottish economist Adam Smith in his classic work, *The Wealth of Nations*. Published in 1776, *The Wealth of Nations* described not only the nature of capitalism but also the role of government in a capitalist economy. That role, according to Smith, was to be extremely limited, or as summarized by Thomas Jefferson, "that government is best that governs least." The principles described by Adam

Smith were economic ideals that no society has completely achieved, but they were ideals that strongly influenced the early leaders of the United States and the development of the U.S. economy.

By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the conversion of European society to secular government and a capitalist economic system was complete. In the United States, only recently freed from its colonial bonds to its "parent" England, the development of capitalism took on a special zeal. Having no aristocracy in the European sense and no entrenched religious establishment, the United States was a fertile ground for freewheeling capitalist enterprise. The existence of an expansive frontier and the continual arrival of industrious immigrants eager to succeed by exploiting the abundant resources of the new nation also contributed to the development of a society that valued personal productivity over inherited status. (The growth of the Horatio Alger legend in America, that the poorest farmer can become the wealthiest entrepreneur by the sheer power of hard work, is an outgrowth of this heritage.)

Throughout the 1800s, commercial enterprise remained relatively free of government interference. Toward the end of the century, however, various sectors of society began to call for government to step in to moderate some of the practices that developed under the free enterprise system. Gradually, the government entered the field of regulation, first regulating such areas as interstate commerce, later acting to protect minor children from ruthless exploitation as cheap labor.

Gradually, government increased its involvement in the economic sector. The principles of pure supply-and-demand capitalism were altered to meet the changing needs of capitalist nations. In the United States, for example, the government has taken on the role of economic regulator, controlling prices in certain industries, labor supply in others, passing regulations that impose costs on producers who in turn pass the costs on to consumers, and in many other ways disturbing Adam Smith's law of supply and demand.

Political factions have developed in the United States in response to the government's greater role in the economy. Some call for the government to reduce its role, allowing the laws of pure capitalism to work more freely. Others favor an even greater role for the government, particularly in providing services for which there is no economic profit, services traditionally ignored by private enterprise. It is likely that these factions will continue to argue, and the U.S. economy will continue to be a mix of capitalist enterprise and government regulation.

## Communism

The basic concept behind communism is a very old one. Many early communities, from the ancient to those that settled in colonial America, governed themselves by the principle of a "common pot" into which everyone poured their labors and from which everyone drew their sustenance. Such communal systems worked with varying degrees of success.

Some of the problems that inevitably arose in the communal systems are among the current problems faced by the Soviet Union. For instance, not everyone contributes equally to "the pot"; those who regularly contribute more begin to feel resentful when they receive the same rewards as those who contribute less. Even in systems that offer greater rewards for more productive work, problems arise because societies always place more value on some types of work than on others. Is it fair, for example, to pay a bureaucrat twice the salary of a construction worker? The construction worker might feel that the bureaucrat sits in a comfortable office, shuffling papers and contributing little, while he works in the hot sun all day to build housing for the society's citizens. But the bureaucrat will claim that he takes responsibility for the difficult decisions that must be made in governing the society. He should be paid for taking such responsibility, he would maintain.

The communist concept of "from each according to ability, to each according to need" might be a noble idea, but an extremely difficult one to implement. Who is to determine how much each citizen needs? Many Americans feel that Soviet citizens are deprived because they do not, as a rule, have the luxuries enjoyed by many U.S. residents. But the Soviet leadership, and Soviet citizens themselves, may have very different ideas about the level of their needs and what they might legitimately expect from their "common pot."

Karl Marx was the most famous exponent of recent communist theory. Reacting to the extreme poverty of the urban masses in highly industrialized nations like England, Marx protested the capitalist system that took the labors of so many people and distributed the profits that resulted from those labors among so few people. Marx saw an inherent unfairness in the system.

According to Marx, such a system was doomed to destroy itself. In its place, he believed, a society would arise in which all property would be owned by the society as a whole. In this communal, or communist, system of ownership, the profits of the citizens' labors would be distributed among them rather than to a few "overlords."

Marx predicted that the abused workers of industrialized cities would overthrow the capitalist system that he felt was oppressing them. The workers' uprising would be spontaneous and democratic in nature.

Marx did not anticipate that the workers would be able to immediately establish a purely communist society. Instead, he felt that the revolutionary state would have to pass through a period of socialism. During this socialist period, all property would belong to the people, but a state structure would exist to administer the property and wealth of the nation until the society evolved to the point where the state would no longer be necessary.

A young Russian student, Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov (Lenin), became a convert to Marxism in 1893. As he continued to develop his thoughts about communism, socialism, and the need for revolution in Russia, he revised some of Marx's ideas in meaningful ways. While Marx and his followers had originally conceived the role of a Socialist party as being primarily one of educating the masses so that they could determine their own fate (presumably by demanding a socialist restructuring of society), Lenin saw the Party as a socialist elite that would provide direction to the masses. In place of the idea that the working masses would make decisions as a group, in a democratic manner, Lenin substituted the concept of a revolutionary elite that would determine political strategy and organize revolutionary activities. Although debate would be allowed among the elite before a decision was reached, once it had been decided, all members would be strictly bound by it, and all debate would end. The current role of the Communist party in the Soviet Union is much closer to Lenin's conception than to that of Marx.

A second major revision in Marxist doctrine that came to characterize Russian socialism was adopted by Lenin but was originally conceptualized by Leon Trotsky, another early Russian revolutionary. Marx had described a revolution that would occur in nations that had already passed through the capitalist stage and were therefore ripe for revolution to socialism and later to communism. Trotsky developed the concept of "permanent revolution," which held that nations like Russia that had not yet passed through the advanced stages of capitalism could nonetheless provide the spark to world revolution. After the spark had been ignited in the more advanced capitalist nations, those countries would help the less developed Russia to maintain socialism successfully. Lenin did not actually accept Trotsky's idea until after the Russian Revolution had successfully occurred. Then, needing an ideological rationale to justify the revolution philosophically, the concept of "permanent revolution" became part of standard *Bolshevik* doctrine.

In applying Marxist doctrine to the fledgling Soviet Union, Lenin made many serious changes, including the development of a ruling Communist party that some charge is as dictatorial as its czarist predecessor. However, Lenin maintained the essential optimism of Marx's belief that a socialist, and then communist, reordering of the world economic system would bring about a more humane world in which all people would be equal. Because he believed the goals of establishing a socialist regime to be so worthy, Lenin justified the violence and repression of individual liberties that accompanied the process. To some extent, the Soviets continue to justify the rigid discipline of the Communist party as a necessary means to a noble end, at which point the need for such strict control will cease to exist.

*Vladimir Ilyich Lenin adopted the communist ideals of Karl Marx, but changed those principles to meet the needs of power politics in the Soviet Union.* Photo: National Archives

Since the early years of the Russian Revolution—when revolutionaries took philosophy very seriously and seemingly minor ideological differences caused serious disputes within competing parties—Soviet leaders have altered socialist doctrine to meet the demands of Soviet society. Those who believe that socialist theory was meant to create an "open" system, capable of changing to fit the needs of different times and societies, see such change as necessary and practical. Others have charged Soviet leaders with "revisionism," accusing them of straying too far from Marx's original concepts.

Some of the recent reforms introduced have been aimed at addressing the Soviet Union's economic problems. Although the Soviets have a *command economy* (one in which all economic decisions have traditionally been made by the central authorities in the Kremlin), the regime has introduced a greater degree of decentralized decision making in recent years. The leadership, hoping to increase worker productivity, has also permitted the institution of merit raises to reward the best workers. In the agricultural sector, many Soviets are now permitted to own private plots of land and to sell at a profit what they grow on those plots. These reforms, borrowed from the capitalist world, are not so drastic that they indicate a serious weakening of the socialist system in the Soviet Union. But whether or not the Soviet Union is moving toward pure communism remains in increasing doubt.

## The Importance of Differing Geopolitical Interests

A nation's foreign policy behavior is affected by its geographic location in the world, as well as by the size of its population, its natural resources, and the size and strength of the nations that surround it. Each of these factors by itself is of limited importance. Taken together, they define the strengths and weaknesses that allow a nation to develop a certain foreign policy. A large country, for instance, may seem more powerful than its tiny neighbor. But does it have a population large enough to defend it in time of war? What about its economic strength? The tiny nation of Japan, for instance, is considered an "economic giant," while its much larger neighbor, the People's Republic of China, remains constrained by its lack of economic development.

In addition to the strengths and weaknesses presented by its geography and *demography*, a nation's foreign policy reflects the stability or instability of its political structures. While the people of Italy may joke about the frequency with which their government changes (Italian governments have at times changed more than once a month), a nation's standing in the world suffers when its leadership is unstable. Even the powerful United States is often criticized for the "flip-flops" in its foreign policy that result from electoral changes that may occur every four years.

This section looks at some of the geographic and political (or "geopolitical") factors that influence U.S. and Soviet foreign policy and therefore the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

### *The United States of America: Sea to Shining Sea*

Protected by oceans on its East and West coasts, and flanked by friendly nations to the North and South, the United States has lived in little fear of invasion from hostile foreign powers.

In its early years of development, the geography of the United States kept the individual states and territories from having much to do with each other. The federal system of government that developed in the United States was designed to accommodate the diversity that existed among regions, with their widely varying needs and demands, while strengthening the national unity needed to establish the United States as a distinct political system. Throughout the nation's first century, the states' common interests were few, and thus the federal government remained small.

The states of America united slowly, taking 125 years for the forty-eight continental states to join together to become a single federal nation; another forty-seven years for the states of Alaska and Hawaii to become part of the union.

Since 1959, the United States has been a country of 3,615,122 square miles. Geographical barriers, such as mountains and rivers, dense forests and wide deserts, are no longer a problem. Linked by extensive railway and highway systems, over five thousand cities (population over 5,000) provide homes for 73.7 percent of America's population of over 230 million people. The fifty states range in size from tiny Rhode Island (1,055 square miles) to gargantuan Alaska (570,833 square miles).

To most people in the United States, foreign countries seem remote. To visit them usually involves traveling over great expanses of water for many hours. It is perhaps equally difficult for Americans to think of "foreign powers," as no foreign nation has occupied U.S. territory, brandishing its "power," for more than 150 years. Some people believe that the United States is not sufficiently aware of the *interdependence* of the nations of the world because of its relative isolation geographically. However, others feel that the United States has become too involved in foreign countries far from its borders and interests at home.



*The United States is bordered by two friendly nations and two oceans.*

America's geographic isolation is somewhat modified by its population's being a "melting pot" of nationalities that immigrated to the United States from all over the world. Different stages in U.S. history saw waves of immigration from particular areas. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, many people from England and Western Europe came to America. In the nineteenth century immigrants from China and Ireland provided the labor for the building of America's transcontinental railroad. Frequently groups came to America to escape religious or political persecution or lack of economic opportunity. Recent waves of immigration have included refugees from Vietnam and Central Americans fleeing both political regimes and economic conditions.

Although the majority of immigrants exchange the language and traditions of their native culture for the language and culture of the United States, many retain a particular interest in political events in their native country. Even the children of immigrants, who may never have visited their cultural homeland, feel a link with the country of their past. Thus, events in Ireland, in Eastern Europe, in Central America, in China, in Israel, and elsewhere hold added significance for U.S. citizens who trace their cultural roots to those areas. These citizens often form lobbying organizations to attempt to influence U.S. foreign policy.

The United States is fortunate to have a population that is both sufficiently "American" to provide a united front in foreign policy, yet diverse enough to provide different perspectives to U.S. foreign policy makers.

### *The Soviet Union: An Expansive Motherland*

The Soviet Union is, in land mass, the largest country in the world. Stretching from Eastern Europe to the Pacific Ocean, the U.S.S.R. incorporates 8,647,250 square miles—more than one-seventh of the earth's land surface. It is easier to compare the size of the Soviet Union with continents than with other countries. For example, the U.S.S.R. is smaller than Africa but larger than South America. It is three times larger than Australia.

Frequently Americans call the Soviet Union "Russia," but that is incorrect. Since 1922, the Soviet Union has been a federal system, composed of individual *union republics* that together form the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.). Russia, or as it is officially called, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.), is the largest of the republics. Russians consider their republic to be the "elder brother" of the fourteen other republics.

The fifteen union republics range in size from Armenia (11,506 square miles—somewhat larger than Maryland) to the Russian republic (6,593,391 square miles—more than ten times the size of Alaska). Each of the Soviet Union's fifteen republics borders on a foreign country or on the Baltic Sea and has an ethnically homogeneous native population. No other na-

*Twelve nations, including rival PRC, surround the Soviet Union.*



## HOW WE COMPARE

| | United States | Soviet Union |
|---|---|---|
| Total Population (1982 est.) | 230,623,400 | 268,800,000 |
| Population Rank in World | Fourth | Third |
| Rural Population (percent) | 21 | 38 |
| Urban Population (percent) | 79 | 62 |
| Work Force Engaged in Agriculture (percent) | 3.4 | 20 |
| Life Expectancy (years) | | |
| Male | 70 | 64 |
| Female | 77.5 | 74 |
| Literacy (percent) | 99 | 99 |
| Leading Exports | Grain, Machinery, High technology equipment, Arms | Petroleum, Iron, Steel, Lumber, Machinery, Arms |
| Leading Imports | Petroleum, Steel, Natural gas, Iron, Motor vehicles | High technology equipment, Grain |

tion in the world shares borders with as many different countries as does the Soviet Union. Being surrounded by so many, often hostile, foreign countries makes the Soviets extremely concerned about maintaining secure borders, safe from invasion.

The Soviet population is an amalgam of a hundred different nationalities. Fifteen of the sixteen largest national groups have their own union republic. Although these republics now peacefully coexist within a united federal structure, some of them were bitter enemies for hundreds of years prior to the imposition of Russian, and then Soviet, rule. Although republics such as Moldavia historically had little opportunity to develop a unique national identity, others, like the Central Asian republics, remain fiercely loyal to political, religious, and cultural traditions that in some cases pre-date Russian civilization itself.

The Soviet regime would like the various nationalities to become dedicated to the Soviet future rather than to their ethnic past. Soviet leaders have spoken of the need to create a Soviet "new man." Such citizens would speak fluent Russian (the official language of the Soviet Union), be highly educated, would be willing to leave their native homelands to work elsewhere in the Soviet Union, and would not be bound by ethnic traditions. A nation of Soviet "new men" would result in a Soviet "melting pot," much like that of the United States. However, the Soviets are far from achieving this goal, and they remain plagued by the "nationalities problem." In the Soviet military, where all commands are given in Russian, many Central Asian recruits find it difficult to learn simple procedures because of their inability to understand the language.

### U.S. and Soviet Political Systems

A political system is a structure through which nations make both decisions and laws. Not all political decisions are translated into laws, but many of them are. Some societies, like those of the United States and the Soviet Union, have different types of laws. For instance, in the United States, laws passed by Congress are called statutory law; laws that result from court rulings are called common law; a third type of law is made when the president issues executive orders; other agencies of the executive branch may issue regulations that equally have the force of law. In the Soviet Union, the situation is much the same, with various organs of the Communist party, the Soviet state, and the Soviet government all having the authority to issue ordinances, decrees, or statutory laws.

Equally important as laws and regulations are the decisions made by political systems, decisions that reflect the society's values, or at least the values of a portion of the society. For instance, the allocation of resources—particularly money—in a society is extremely important. Will more or less money be spent on arms, social welfare, highways, housing, education, medical research? These decisions guide a nation's development. They are principally the result of lengthy, often painful, decision-making processes, much of which go on behind closed doors.

Both decision making and law making are a combination of formal and informal processes. Frequently, the formal decision to pass a piece of legislation or issue a regulation is the result of extensive informal lobbying by competing interest groups and by members of the political organizations themselves. In the Soviet Union, there is little debate after a decision has been made; the passing of the law instituting the decision is a formality. But that should not lead those in the West to think that in the Soviet Union decisions are not heatedly debated for lengthy periods before they are finally resolved.

The "players" in the decision-making and law-making apparatuses in both countries are in some cases the same, in other cases different. Generally, the decision-making structure draws on many more people than does the law-making system. Among those who play a role in the decision-making system are influential members of the media, lobbying organizations, and others whose opinions may be sought on an issue because of their expertise in that area.

Decisions and laws may be mutually complementary, or they may conflict with each other. In the United States, for instance, members of Congress may pass a law designed to render less effective (or, in their minds, "less damaging") an executive order passed by the president. Or an executive branch agency may refuse to request funds in its budget to implement a law passed by Congress. While there may be a high level of disorder in such a system, its citizens take pride in the degree of democracy that permits such active representation of opposing values. In the Soviet Union, the most important decisions are made by the leadership of the Communist party. The laws passed by state and government leaders faithfully reflect those decisions. Soviet citizens take pride in the stability of their system. Their political history is not one of parliamentary debate; therefore, continuity of policy may be more important to Soviets than active and open feuding among competing factions.

This section describes the political systems of both nations. A very great difference between the systems is that the Soviet economy is a command economy, one in which the party and the government determine the level of prices, wages, and supply and production of goods and services. (In the United States, those levels are generally controlled by the marketplace.) The Soviet political system therefore has the additional burden of running the economy. This responsibility is easier to meet when power is more centralized. (A small group makes a decision more easily than does a large group.) Yet some Soviet decision makers believe that more decisions need to be made at the local level. One of the greatest questions currently facing the Soviet political system is what level of decentralization in economic decision making to allow.

### *The U.S. System*

In the United States, the formal decision-making structure is determined by a constitution. The U.S. Constitution established a tri-partite system of government, with each of the three parts, or branches, exercising a "checks and balances" role toward the other two. The three branches of the U.S. government are: 1) the executive branch, 2) the legislative branch, and 3) the judicial branch.

Through two hundred years of interpretation and the need to respond to events that the authors of the Constitution could not possibly have foreseen, the powers and responsibilities of each of the three branches of the U.S. government have changed considerably over time. However, to the credit of the Constitution's authors, the basic principle of each branch's "checking" the power of the others, so that no one group could gain too much control, has remained intact.

Perhaps the branch that has changed most substantially is the executive branch. George Washington's first cabinet had only four members: the secretaries of state, treasury, and war, and the attorney general. Now there are thirteen cabinet departments, and each department has hundreds to thousands of employees. Likewise, an extensive office of the president, unknown in earlier times, has been created to help meet the increasing responsibilities of the president. Those respon-



*President Jimmy Carter addresses a joint session of Congress as members of the press look on.* Photo: National Archives

## THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH


The President
Executive Office of the President (partial listing)
Vice President
White House Staff
National Security Council
Domestic Policy Staff
Office of Management and Budget
Central Intelligence Agency
Council of Economic Advisors
Council of Environmental Quality
Office of Science and Technology Policy
Office of Special Representative for Trade Negotiations
The Cabinet Departments
Energy
State
Justice
Education
Commerce
Transportation
Housing and Urban Development
Agriculture
Treasury
Health and Human Services
Interior
Labor
Defense
Independent Agencies and Regulatory Commissions

## THE JUDICIAL BRANCH


U.S. Supreme Court
U.S. Court of Appeals
U.S. District Courts
Tax Court of the United States
U.S. Court of Claims


THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

Senate
House of Representatives
Vice President
George Bush
President Pro Tempore
Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.)
Speaker of the House
Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. (D-Mass.)
Majority Leader
Howard Baker (R-Tenn.)
Majority Whip
Ted Stevens (R-Alaska)
Minority Leader
Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.)
Minority Whip
Alan Cranston (D-Calif.)
Minority Leader
Robert Michel (R-Ill.)
Minority Whip
Trent Lott (R-Miss.)
Majority Leader
James Wright (D-Texas)
Majority Whip
Thomas Foley (D-Wash.)
Select or Special Committees (5)
Standing Committees (15)
Joint Committees
Standing Committees (22)
Select Committees (6)
Subcommittees of Standing Committees (93)
Subcommittees of Standing Committees (125)

sibilities now include conducting foreign policy, sending major legislative initiatives to Congress, serving as commander in chief of the military, acting as head of his political party, and creating law through executive fiat. Although the president has extensive powers, he still has to play the role of the lobbyist in trying to influence members of Congress and the public in order to have his policies successfully implemented. The president is able to "check" the power of the other two branches by vetoing legislation passed by Congress, by invoking executive privilege to withhold information from Congress and the courts, and by making appointments to the Supreme Court.

The legislative branch of the U.S. government is a bicameral body composed of the House of Representatives, whose membership is based on each state's population, and the Senate, whose membership is evenly divided among the states. All legislation having to do with financial appropriations originates in the House. Both houses have a system of committees and subcommittees that hold hearings on legislative proposals before sending them to the full membership of each house for a vote.

The degree to which the U.S. Congress becomes involved in foreign policy decision making has varied over the years. During the 1970s Congress reasserted its foreign policy authority, partially in response to its perception that the executive branch had led the country into a disastrous conflict in Southeast Asia in the 1960s. In 1974, Congress passed the War Powers Act, which prohibits the president from committing U.S. troops for more than ninety days without the consent of Congress. The Senate also has the power to ratify treaties and approve the appointment of ambassadors and other key national security personnel. In recent years, conflict between the executive branch and Congress developed over Senate opposition to the SALT II treaty signed by President Carter and over several of President Reagan's appointments to key arms control negotiating positions.

The federal legal system in the United States is headed by the nine-member Supreme Court, whose members are appointed by the president and confirmed by Congress (thereby giving each of the other two branches some "checking" authority). Of the thousands of requests that the Supreme Court receives yearly from citizens eager to argue their cases before the highest court, it can schedule only a small fraction.

The Supreme Court exercises a certain power over the legislative branch in its role as interpreter of the Constitution. Laws passed by Congress have at times been challenged as unconstitutional and ruled invalid by the High Court.

Although the Supreme Court generally does not play a large role in foreign policy, it has at times challenged the constitutionality of foreign policy actions taken by a president or by Congress. Its authority in this area, however, has been limited by its inability to enforce its decisions.

### *The Soviet System*

The Soviet system is composed of three separate structures: the Communist party, the Soviet state, and the Soviet government. The Communist party provides

Soviet society's direction—economically, politically, and militarily. The Soviet government is instrumental in executing the policies determined by the party hierarchy. The organization of each is discussed below.

*The Communist Party*

At the top of the Communist party hierarchy is the Central Committee; at the bottom, approximately 400,000 primary organizations located in all types of local organizations and workplaces. In between, a hierarchy of thousands of party professionals helps to determine and carry out the policies that guide the Soviet Union.

The Communist party continues to operate by the principle of centralized decision making established by Lenin. (See *Communism*, p. 8). The following explanation of centralism appeared in the 1980 yearbook of the Soviet press agency, *Novosti*.

> Centralism means discipline and unity. The decisions and directives of higher Party bodies are binding on the lower Party organizations; the minority must submit to the decision of the majority.

Under the Party rules every Party member has the right to criticize and to express his opinion on any question. When a decision is adopted, however, it is binding on all Party members.

According to the Soviet constitution, the Party's "supreme organ" is the Party Congress that is convened "at least once every five years." However, because of the infrequency of its meetings and its large size (since 1961, more than four thousand delegates have attended each session), the ability of the Congress to conduct substantive debates and decision making is severely limited.

*Yuri Andropov succeeded Leonid Brezhnev as General Secretary of the Communist Party, the most powerful position in the Soviet hierarchy.*
Photo. Novosti Press Agency

Between Party Congresses, all party activities are directed by a Central Committee. The membership of the Central Committee has expanded over the years, from three members in 1898 to its current membership of 318. In addition to voting members, the Central Committee currently has 150 candidate members, who may join in debate about issues but not vote. The Central Committee conducts its business during a series of plenary sessions. Again, because of its size, such meetings are necessarily limited. The Central Committee therefore elects a Political Bureau, or Politburo, to direct Party activity between its meetings.

It is the decisions of the Politburo about which Americans hear most frequently. Membership in the

**Communist Party Hierarchy**



**Politburo Members as of October 1983:**

Yuri Andropov, *68, general secretary of the Communist party*
Geyder Aliyev, *59, party leader in Azerbaidzhan*
Konstanstin Chernenko, *71, party secretary*
Mikhail Gorbachev, *51, party secretary, specializing in agriculture*
Viktor Grishin, *68, Moscow party chief*
Andrei Gromyko, *73, foreign minister*
Dinmuhamed Kunayev, *70, party chief in Kazakhstan*
Grigori Romanov, *59, party chief of the Leningrad region*
Viktor Shcherbitsky, *64, party chief in the Ukraine*
Nikolai Tikhonov, *77, premier*
Dmitri Ustinov, *74, minister of defense*


The Soviet Government Hierarchy
The Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.
The Chairman of the Soviet of the Union and Four Vice-Chairmen
The Soviet of the Union: 750 deputies
The Soviet of Nationalities: 750 deputies
The Chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities and Four Vice-Chairmen
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.
Standing Commissions of the Soviet of the Union (16 in 1980)
Standing Commissions of the Soviet of Nationalities (16 in 1980)
The Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.
The Committee of People's Control of the U.S.S.R.
The Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R.
The Procurator-General of the U.S.S.R.

Politburo is highly political, and the number of regular and candidate members may fluctuate. Usually there are about eleven or twelve full members and six to nine candidate members. The Politburo membership includes the highest ranking Soviet officials. Sovietologist John Reshetar describes the working of the Politburo as follows:

> Central Committee resolutions usually reflect Politburo decisions and the Politburo also issues directives to various government ministries and agencies. It takes up urgent problems brought before it by the departments of the Party Secretariat, by a ministry, or by the Council of Ministers. Individual Politburo members often have a field of specialization for which they are responsible, deciding matters of lesser import independently and referring difficult cases to the entire Politburo. On occasion the Politburo has discussed matters that would appear to be trivial in other regimes. When the Politburo has not been able to resolve internal conflicts involving a struggle for power, those conflicts have been taken to the Central Committee. The presence of a dominant personality, such as Lenin or Stalin...has determined the way in which the Politburo would function and has restricted its freedom of action. In the absence of such a dictator, arbiter, or strong personality, decisions have been arrived at "collectively" with more deliberation and less dispatch.
>
> In addition to the Politburo, the Central Committee elects a Secretariat. The Secretariat directs the Party's vast administrative apparatus. It oversees the appointment of Communist party cadres, directs the Party's daily activities, and ensures that the Party's policy directives are being carried out. The Secretariat has varied in size, from three to fourteen members.

*The Supreme Soviet*

The Soviet constitution refers to the Supreme Soviet as the "highest organ of state power in the U.S.S.R." Western analysts have frequently referred to it as a mere "rubber stamp," whose sole function is to routinely approve Communist party decisions. The truth lies somewhere in between.

The Supreme Soviet is composed of two chambers, the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities. The chambers have an equal number of representatives, equal powers to initiate legislation, are organized in the same manner, and employ identical procedures. The only difference between them is that the Soviet of the Nationalities is responsible for issues that apply to specific national groups, while the Soviet of the Union addresses issues of universal concern.

The Supreme Soviet meets for several days each year. Its "legislators" are not professional politicians but people with regular jobs who take leave to attend the sessions, much like representatives to state legislatures in the United States. The reason that many in the West feel that the Supreme Soviet merely rubber-stamps Party decisions is because of the shortness of the sessions, the fact that voting is done by a show of hands only, and because all votes are unanimous.

Since the Soviet Union has become an increasingly industrial nation with increasingly complex economic problems to resolve, the Supreme Soviet has taken on greater significance. Just as the "real" work of the U.S. Congress is done by its committees and subcommittees, so the Supreme Soviet has a number of commissions and subcommissions that hold hearings and otherwise gather expert testimony on complex issues being considered by the state. Just as in democracies, where information is power because decisions are made based on the information presented to the decision makers, so too in the Soviet Union are difficult economic choices greatly influenced by the information presented to decision makers. The commissions of the Supreme Soviet furnish just such information.

Another way in which the Supreme Soviet performs a typically legislative function is that some ministers (although not a great many) are allowed to bring to the attention of the group the particular economic interests of their constituencies. The sessions of the ministers are also occasions on which individual ministries may be criticized by the regime for inadequate production. In other ways as well, the Supreme Soviet is used as a sounding board by the regime, to disseminate both foreign and domestic policy decisions.

Just as the Politburo directs daily Communist party activity between meetings of the Central Committee and Party Congresses, so the Supreme Soviet elects a Presidium to direct daily legislative activities. The Presidium consists of a chairman, a first vice-chairman, fifteen vice-chairmen (one from each Union Republic), a secretary, and twenty-one members. Leonid Brezhnev, general secretary of the Communist party from 1964 to 1982, also acted as chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet from 1977 until 1982.

The responsibilities of the Presidium are extremely varied, from supervising the legislative work of the commissions to supervising the military (although the most important decisions are made by the Party) and exercising certain legal functions, such as granting pardons and amnesties. The Presidium also monitors public opinion by referring citizen letters, complaints, and appeals to the appropriate agency.

### *The U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers*

If the Supreme Soviet ("the state") is somewhat akin to a legislative branch, the Council of Ministers acts like an executive branch. (The Soviets consider the Council of Ministers more generally as "the government.") The chairman of the Council of Ministers is the "premier" or "president" of the nation; but, in fact, that person is not necessarily the most powerful political figure in the Soviet decision-making hierarchy. When Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev had reached their most powerful position as general secretary of the Communist party, they chose to assume the position of premier as well. However, Leonid Brezhnev never assumed the title but was clearly the most powerful individual in the Soviet hierarchy in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s.

Just as the executive branch in the United States can make law by issuing regulations—usually based on laws passed by Congress—so the Council of Ministers in the Soviet Union issues ordinances said to be based on laws passed by the Supreme Soviet. There are two types of ordinances: those that establish general policy and those that more specifically implement policy. The first reflect value judgments made by the Communist party and are issued by the Council as a group; the second are more technically oriented and are signed only by the chairman or a deputy.

The relationship between the Communist party and the Soviet government is a complex one that cannot simply be explained by assuming that the Communist party is all-powerful and the government all-weak. There are many overlapping players in the different hierarchies. For example, a substantial majority of the Presidium's members are members or candidate members of the Party Central Committee. While this dual role ensures that party positions are effectively reflected in state policies, it also means that the positions of state officials become known to the most powerful party members and inevitably affect the decision-making process.

The Soviet decision-making and law-making apparatuses have changed over the years. In the Stalin years, leaders were purged when Stalin felt they had gained enough authority to pose a challenge. During Khrushchev's regime, insecurity in the ranks continued as the general secretary conducted business in an arbitrary, frequently contradictory way. One of Leonid Brezhnev's goals was to bring a sense of stability and professionalism to the leadership. By all signs, he achieved a large measure of success. One indication of that success was the smooth way in which the transition of power was made after his death in November 1982.

## Summary

- A major difference between the United States and the Soviet Union is their economic systems. The economy of the United States, although not purely capitalist, is largely based on the principles of capitalism. Those principles include private ownership of property, the law of supply and demand, and the limitation of government's role in the economy. The Soviet Union has a socialist economy, which may or may not evolve into a communist economy. In a communist economy, property is owned by society as a whole, there is no need for a government, and everyone contributes based on their ability, taking what they need to live. In a socialist economy, the government administers the communally owned property on behalf of the people. In the Soviet Union, the Communist party and the Soviet state and government play a central role in directing the economy.

- A nation's foreign policy is influenced by geopolitical factors such as its location, population, resource needs, and political system. Both the United States and the Soviet Union are industrial, largely urban societies with a wealth of natural resources. Because the Soviet Union borders twelve foreign countries, it is particularly concerned with security. Although, historically, the United States has been geographically protected, it has developed economic interests in many parts of the world, which it feels a strong commitment to protect.

- The U.S. population is a "melting pot" of nationalities that have come from around the world seeking political and religious freedom and economic betterment. Although some immigrants maintain the language and cultural traditions of their native land, most become "Americanized" rather quickly. Their children are almost always more American than Irish, Italian, German, or Chinese.

  The Soviet population is composed of many different nationalities, most of whom speak different native languages and remain committed to their cultural pasts. Soviet leaders would like to create a Soviet "melting pot," which would produce citizens more committed to the Soviet future than to their cultural past.

- The United States has a tri-partite, or three-sided, government composed of an executive branch, a legislative branch, and a judicial branch. The legislative branch passes laws to govern U.S. society; the executive branch translates those laws into regulations that it then enforces; and the judicial branch interprets the laws and makes judgments about whether or not laws have been broken.

- The three branches of the U.S. government exercise a "checks and balances" function with respect to each other. That way, no one branch can assume too much unquestioned authority. The executive branch has the principal responsibility for foreign policy, particularly the president, the Department of State, and the National Security Council. However, Congress has taken a more active role in determining foreign policy in the past decade.

- The Soviet Union's political system is divided into three parts: the Communist party, the Soviet state, and the Soviet government. The Communist party provides the leadership and direction of Soviet society. In organization, the Soviet state is roughly equivalent to the U.S. legislative branch, and the Soviet government may be compared to the U.S. executive branch. Although it is clear that the Communist party is by far the most powerful of the three, both the Soviet state and government play an active role in running the very large and highly complex Soviet nation.

# Evolution of U.S.-Soviet Relations

### IDEAS TO CONSIDER WHILE YOU READ

As you read this section, consider the following questions and try to develop answers. In some cases, there is more than one way to look at things. Stretch your imagination and try to see events as a Soviet citizen might, or as an American citizen in another time might have.

- Was the United States or the Soviet Union more to blame for the conditions under which their relationship began? Were they equally responsible?
- Should the United States have given diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union before 1933 even though it opposed its policies?
- Is it easier to cooperate with an opponent if you are both fighting a common enemy? If so, why?
- Why did the wartime cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union break down immediately after World War II?
- How does a "cold war" differ from a "hot" or "shooting war"?
- Why did the United States feel threatened when the Soviets placed missiles and bombers in Cuba? If the Soviets had not removed the missiles, should the United States have gone to war over the issue?
- Why are arms control agreements important?
- What did the United States hope to gain from detente? What did the Soviet Union hope to gain? Were these expectations realistic?
- Why did detente break down? Was it inevitable that it would not last?
- How do world events affect U.S.-Soviet relations?

> *There are at the present time two great nations in the world, which started from different points but seem to tend towards the same end. I allude to the Russians and the Americans. Both of them have grown up unnoticed; and whilst the attention of mankind was directed elsewhere, they have suddenly placed themselves in the front rank among the nations, and the world learned their existence and their greatness at almost the same time.... Their starting point is different, and their courses are not the same; yet each of them seems marked out by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe.*
>
> Alexis de Tocqueville, 1831

## Getting Off to a Bad Start: 1914-1920

In 1914 the First World War broke out in Europe. On one side, known as "the Entente," were Britain, France, and Russia; on the other, Germany and Austria. Russia's participation in the war was deemed crucial by the West because it presented an eastern front that diverted approximately 130 German divisions from other battlefields. As the war drew on, however, massive losses and widespread famine caused the Russian people to lose confidence in their emperor, Czar Nicholas II. In March [illegible]17 food riots broke out in the city of Petrograd (now Leningrad). When even the conservative political factions, including the army generals, refused to support the emperor, he was forced to abdicate his throne. The Russian people, long used to authoritarian, monarchic rule, were left without a head of state. For a time, a provisional government was established, headed by a liberal member of the aristocracy, Prince Lvov. However, factional disputes remained intense, the suffering caused by the war continued, and no single group seemed able to control the chaos.

The Western powers, including the United States, supported the new regime and quickly gave it diplomatic recognition. However, they were unable to provide the economic assistance desperately needed by the war-ravaged Russian economy. By the time U.S. troops entered the war on the side of the Entente, many Russians were calling for an end to Russian participation in the war. One of these groups was the Bolsheviks, led by the charismatic leader Vladimir Ilyich Lenin.

On November 7, 1917, the Bolsheviks led a successful coup against the provisional government. In the West this has become known as the Russian Revolution. For the next three years violence gripped the country, as the Bolsheviks consolidated their hold on the government, fighting rival groups both from within their own party and from groups that wanted a return to aristocratic rule.

On November 8, 1917, the new *Soviet* government issued what might be considered its first foreign policy statement. The statement, entitled "Decree on Peace," called for an immediate peace without annexation (that is, without one power seizing the land of another). The new Soviet leaders addressed their appeal not only to the governments of the warring nations but also to the "class-conscious workers" of those nations. Their message to the workers was that the interests of working class people were a common tie that went beyond the bond of national identity. This was to be a much repeated theme of the Bolsheviks, one that would cause great anxiety among leaders of Western governments, who recognized that their legitimacy was based on their peoples' commitment to a national identity and not to an identity based on economic class.

On March 3, 1918, the new Soviet regime signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany, withdrawing from the war and ceding much of its territory to its former enemy. The Germans, with more than 100 divisions newly freed, launched a devastating offensive on the western front. In June the United States began sending troops to northern and northeastern Russia in an effort to draw German resources from the embattled Western front.

The First World War ended on November 11, 1918, but violence continued to rage within the fledgling Soviet state. A civil war was being fought between supporters of the Bolshevik-dominated Soviet state (the "Reds") and those who opposed them (the "Whites"). Among those who opposed the Bolsheviks were at least eighteen rival "governments" as well as roving bands of Imperial Army troops and members of the former aristocracy.

At the end of the summer of 1918, U.S. forces already positioned in Russia began giving support to various "White Russian" groups. This support has always been cited by the Soviets as an attempt to "strangle Bolshevism in its cradle." American opposition to the Bolsheviks dashed Lenin's earlier hopes that active trade relations could be established between the United States and Soviet Russia.

By 1920 the Bolshevik faction had secured incontestable authority over the country. The United States and the other major Western powers refused to grant diplomatic recognition to the Soviet government, demanding that it first repay international debts incurred by the Czar's regime. Thus, U.S.-Soviet relations began under a cloud.

### The World Rebuilds, Then Goes Back to War: 1922-1945

Throughout the 1920s both the United States and the Soviet Union turned their attention inward, laboring to rebuild their war-torn economies. Until his death in 1925, Lenin continued to secure his hold over the Communist party and continued to expand the authority of the new Soviet government in political, economic, and geographic scope. Programs designed to convert the largely agrarian Russian economy to a more industrialized society dedicated to socialist principles were intensified by Lenin's successor, Josef Stalin. During this period the U.S.S.R. viewed Great Britain, and not the United States, as its principal antagonist in the West. The Soviets sought from America transfers of technology and the sale of industrial machinery. The fact that the United States did not block such activities indicates that it did not yet view the Soviet Union as a serious threat to its own security. However, the United States did continue to deny diplomatic recognition to Lenin's, and then Stalin's, government. When it finally established formal relations in November 1933, it was the last great power to do so.

The 1930s brought worldwide depression. In America millions were jobless and homeless. In an effort to protect their industries, nations passed restrictive tariff laws, which all but ended world trade, encouraging nations to become politically isolationist. In Germany the repressions of the Nazi party were growing, but the world seemed not to notice. In the Soviet Union rapid industrialization was being achieved but at great hardship to laborers forced to live with many restrictions on their freedom. Stalin was a ruthless leader. Reports of bloody purges designed to eliminate competing centers of power and of cruel mass deportations of ethnic minorities to achieve forced collectivization of agriculture reached the West and disappointed many who had held high hopes for the "workers' state."

On August 23, 1939, Stalin entered into a non-aggression treaty with Hitler. (The treaty, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, was officially signed on September 28, 1939.) Stalin later maintained that he had had no choice, that the pact had been made "at the point of a gun." The Nazi-Soviet alliance remained in shaky semblance until June 22, 1941, when Germany attacked the Soviet Union. On July 13, 1941, the Soviet Union and Britain signed a mutual aid agreement. U.S. entrance into the war on December 7th of that year marked the beginning of the Grand Alliance between Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States.

Although the Allied effort was not without disharmony, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union remained good throughout the war. The people of both nations were making valiant efforts to defeat German fascism. The Soviets eventually lost twenty million people to the cause.

### One War Ends and a "Cold War" Begins: 1945-1947

In February 1945, when the defeat of Germany and its allies was imminent, the leaders of the Grand Alliance met in Yalta, a resort town in the Soviet Union, to plan for the future of Europe. Britain succeeded in restoring a stable political order in Western Europe by insisting

*Leaders of the Grand Alliance--Winston Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt, and Josef Stalin--meet at Yalta in 1945 to discuss the geographic boundaries of post-World War II Europe.*
Photo: Library of Congress

on the restoration of French military and political power. The United States sowed the seeds of what was to become its thirty-eight year presence in Western Europe. Germany and its capital, Berlin, were divided into zones to be occupied by each of the Grand Alliance members and by France. The Soviets succeeded in gaining control of the Kurile Islands in the Pacific, a Russian goal that pre-dated the 1917 revolution. With the Soviet army firmly entrenched in Eastern Europe, a large part of the huge German empire went to Soviet control. Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe was established.

After Yalta a new world order emerged. For the first time for either country, the United States and the Soviet Union were undisputed world powers. Neither country had the foreign policy experience or a foreign policy bureaucracy in place to cope readily with its sudden international superpower status.

The cooperative efforts of the Grand Alliance faded even before the formal end of the war. Conflict developed over Soviet domination of the Polish government in violation of the Yalta accords. The Soviets felt similarly threatened by the separate talks being held by the Americans and the British with their recent enemy, the Germans. President Roosevelt's death on April 12, 1945, further jeopardized the fragile alliance that had been so dependent on personal diplomacy. The Soviets were well aware that the new American president, Harry Truman, felt greater hostility toward the Soviet regime than had his predecessor. Thus, even before the United States ended its war with Japan, it had entered a new type of war with its former ally, a "Cold War."

MBS
CBS
BLUE
NBC

*President Harry Truman described communism as "the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority."*
Photo: Library of Congress

## The Birth of Bipolar Politics: 1947-1955

On March 12, 1947, President Truman went before a joint session of Congress and asked that the United States grant aid to the nations of Greece and Turkey to fight the spread of communism there. In his speech, he described "the communist way of life" as "the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority." This policy of attempting to contain the spread of communism by granting aid to governments challenged by communist factions became known as the Truman Doctrine. Sovietologist Adam Ulam describes the impact of Truman's rhetoric upon U.S. foreign policy:

> The speech could hardly have unduly ruffled the Soviet leaders' feelings. In the years since 1945, their own language in reference to the United States and Britain had hardly been more complimentary. But it was a startling departure from

### What Is a "Cold War?"

According to political analyst William Safire, the term "cold war" was coined by Herbert Bayard Swope in a speech he wrote for statesman Bernard Baruch. In an April 1947 speech, Baruch used the term to describe the atmosphere of warlike tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union that existed without the actual presence of military hostilities. Newspaper columnist Walter Lippmann picked up the phrase and made it famous in his columns.

Safire writes that the phrase "gained international currency" when (Soviet) Deputy Premier Nikolai Bulganin used it in his opening speech at the Big Four Conference in Geneva on July 18, 1955. Bulganin spoke of the Soviet "desire for a settlement of the outstanding international problems and for the termination of the Cold War."

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s American and Soviet citizens grew accustomed to the fact that their countries were "at war" with each other without actually being engaged in military battle. The weapons used by the United States and the Soviet Union to fight the Cold War were:

- propaganda aimed at their own populations and at the populations of foreign nations,
- the development of increasingly intimidating nuclear and conventional weapons arsenals,
- covert operations by their intelligence services,
- foreign and military aid designed to win friends among the nations not strictly aligned with either side,
- political battles within the United Nations to gain international support for competing positions.

Just as truces may be declared in "hot" or "shooting" wars, so the United States and the U.S.S.R. seemed to declare a truce in their cold war. The beginning of the truce was signalled by the signing of the SALT I treaty in 1972. The era of reduced tensions it ushered in became known as *detente.* In 1973 David Rockefeller founded the Trilateral Commission, a group of U.S. decision-makers interested in fostering a pro-detente foreign policy. Political commentator Richard Barnet describes the approach taken by the commission:

> Its major premise was that the growing conflicts within the industrial world, the collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary arrangements, and the world energy crisis constituted the most urgent national security problems. International relations should no longer be viewed through the prism of American-Soviet confrontation. The Cold War was over.

But the truce was not to last. By the end of the 1970s, Cold War rhetoric began to reappear in the speeches of U.S. and Soviet leaders. Domestic conditions in both countries encouraged the rise of hardline factions that had opposed detente. In the Soviet Union the anticipation of Leonid Brezhnev's death led to a power struggle between political factions. No faction could appear weak on the "American question." In the United States, generally deteriorating economic conditions, a loss of U.S. "face" in Iran, and a lessening of Vietnam-inspired isolationism led to a national desire to reassert American predominance in the world. That climate fostered a confrontational posture with the Soviets.

Whether or not the chill in detente will cause the superpowers to return to the level of hostility and lack of communication that existed in the 1950s remains to be seen. Not all of the channels of communication established during the "thaw" have been closed. There are indications that conditions in the United States and the Soviet Union may have shifted once again, this time in favor of more cordial relations. The Soviet Union faces great economic problems and a population no longer accustomed to foregoing consumer goods in favor of a vast military build-up. There are personnel shortages in all sectors of the economy, including the military, and such shortages promise to get worse. The new Communist party leader, Yuri Andropov, (or his successor should one arise quickly) will need a period of stability in foreign relations if he is to concentrate his efforts on the problematic economic sector. In the United States the growth of a grassroots movement in support of a nuclear arms freeze has forced the president to pursue a more moderate course than that called for by the "Cold Warriors." Likewise, the West European members of NATO have lobbied U.S. leaders to assume a more detente-like posture vis-a-vis the Soviets.

wartime oratory. Truman could not go into the hopeless complexities of the world crisis; instead, that crisis was dramatized as a contest between two ways of life, the communist one spreading in "the evil soil of poverty and strife" and the democratic one "based upon the will of the majority...." Just as during the war alliance with Stalin's Russia had been justified by presenting that country as a virtual democracy, so now the policy of containing Soviet expansion was presented as a struggle between light and darkness. In both instances the departure from political realism was to have a debilitating effect on American foreign policy.

Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union continued to chill. On April 1, 1948, the Soviet Union began a land blockade of the portions of Germany's divided capital, Berlin, that were occupied by Western forces. The Western powers responded with a counter-blockade and with the airlifting of 2,343,315 tons of food and coal into the city. The crisis continued for more than a year until, on September 30, 1949, both blockades were lifted. By that time irreparable harm had been done to U.S.-Soviet relations.

In the midst of the Berlin blockade, the United States and Britain led the creation of a military alliance among Western European powers and themselves, which was designed to provide a strong front against what they believed was a Soviet Red Army capable of sweeping through Europe. On April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was created. Its members agreed to support each other militarily in the event of an attack against any of them. The initial NATO members were Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United States. In 1952 Greece and Turkey joined; in 1955 West Germany became the fifteenth member. (In 1982 Spain joined the NATO alliance.)

Scholars disagree about the Soviet reaction to the formation of NATO. Some believe Stalin saw the alliance as an ominous threat to the Soviet Union; those scholars see particular significance in the fact that the Soviets successfully tested their first atomic bomb in 1949. Others, however, believe the Soviets did not really fear NATO until West Germany joined in 1955. That group points out that not until West Germany had become part of the alliance did the Soviet Union feel compelled to create a counter-alliance, the Warsaw Pact. That alliance was composed of eight East European nations: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the U.S.S.R. (In 1968 Albania left the Pact.)


NATO NATIONS
WARSAW PACT NATIONS
Iceland
Atlantic Ocean
N.I.
Scotland
Ireland
Denmark
Netherlands
United Kingdom
Norway
Sweden
Finland
USSR
Bel.
Lux.
W. Germany
E. Ger.
Poland
Czech.
Austria
Hungary
Romania
Switz.
France
Italy
Yugoslavia
Bulgaria
Black Sea
Portugal
Spain
Alb.
Greece
Turkey
Sicily
Mediterranean Sea
Canada
United States

Adding to the post-war tensions in the West was the news that the four-year battle between Nationalists and Communists in China had ended in victory for the Chinese Communist party. On October 1, 1949, the People's Republic of China was established. The ruling communist faction immediately allied itself with the Soviet Union, which had supported it throughout its war with the Nationalists (who had been supported by the United States). Although it could provide little economic support to the communist "world," the psychological effect of China's immense population's "going communist" added to increasing Western fears of communist world domination.

By 1955 the world was politically divided in two: those within the Western, i.e. American, sphere of influence and those within the Soviet sphere. Sovietologist Thomas Larson describes the American outlook that distinguished between communist totalitarianism, which was considered wholly evil, and other totalitarian governments, which were not considered as repressive as long as they remained allied with the West:

> If postwar totalitarian theory sought to link the extinct Nazi and Fascist states with existing Communist states, it simultaneously sought to differentiate [Communist states] from "merely" authoritarian regimes. A deep divide was posited between Communist states and all others. The former were assigned to the category of "totalitarian" governments, the latter—whether democratic or dictatorial—to the category "free world." In this dichotomy freedom came to mean nothing more or less than freedom from communist rule.

## Nuclear Brinksmanship: The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962

The Cuban missile crisis lasted only seven days. Yet when it was over, relations between the two major powers on earth had changed in a significant way. Having ventured to the brink of nuclear war, the United States and the Soviet Union scared themselves into entering a new era in bilateral relations, the era of arms control negotiations.

The story of the Cuban missile crisis in some ways began more than 150 years ago when President James Monroe proclaimed the U.S. foreign policy that came to bear his name. The Monroe Doctrine held that "the American continents...by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power." The doctrine was aimed at major European colonial powers, particularly Spain, France, and Russia. The United States feared that Spain might try to win back its newly freed colonies in South and Central America and that the other European powers might aid Spain in doing so. In declaring its interest in the maintenance of a free and sovereign Western Hemisphere, the United States sent a "hands off" message to the rest of the world. Since that time, when foreign powers have attempted to gain political or military control of any country in the Western Hemisphere, the United States has cited the Monroe Doctrine as the basis for its own intervention in opposition to those forces. Although the United States had limited economic and political interests in South and Central America when President Monroe originally proclaimed the policy, since that time the United States has developed extensive interdependent ties with those nations that make its commitment to their freedom from outside domination even more important.

The tiny country of Cuba, ninety miles off the shore of Florida, is one of the nations "covered" by the Monroe Doctrine. Throughout most of the 1950s Cuba was ruled by a corrupt and harsh dictator, Fulgencio Batista. In January 1959 Batista was overthrown by a young revolutionary leader, Fidel Castro. The United States opposed the new regime and refused it economic assistance because some of its leaders were socialist. Castro then turned to the Soviet Union, which eagerly sought to bring Cuba into its political orbit. Under Castro, many reforms were initiated; however, the harsh repression of individual liberties characteristic of the Batista regime continued under the Castro regime. Many Cubans who opposed the socialist policies of Castro's government fled to the United States. Some of them vowed to return to "liberate" Cuba from Castro's control. Many paramilitary groups were formed in the Miami, Florida, area, where most of the Cuban emigres lived. Some of these groups received training and other assistance from agencies of the U.S. government. In April 1961 about fourteen hundred Cubans attempted an invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. The attempt failed. In the process, hostility between the United States and Cuba reached a new height and relations between the Soviet Union and the United States became extremely strained. Cuba became firmly entrenched in the socialist camp, and the Soviet Union achieved an unprecedented "toehold" in the Western Hemisphere.

In October 1962 U.S. reconnaissance planes photographed evidence of the installation of Soviet missiles and bombers in Cuba. The reaction of U.S.



*President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev talk at a 1960 summit conference. Two years later they were locked in a battle of wills over the placement of Soviet missiles in Cuba.*
Photo: National Archives

President John Kennedy was immediate and strong. The president ordered a naval blockade of Cuba and publicly demanded that the Soviets remove all the weapons at once. The president implied that the United States was prepared to wage war if they were not removed. After several extraordinarily tense days, the Soviets agreed to remove the weapons.

The 1960s were tumultuous years for both nations and for the rest of the world. In the Soviet Union a triumverate of leaders, Leonid Brezhnev, Nikolai Podgorny, and Alexei Kosygin, replaced Nikita Khrushchev. They had much to accomplish. Khrushchev's policies had badly split the Communist party and virtually destroyed morale in the military services. His diplomatic defeat in the Cuban missile crisis was a source of international embarrassment to the Soviets.

In the United States domestic dissent was brewing. The civil rights movement with its charismatic leader, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., succeeded in ending the century-old segregation that had divided black and white America. But the effort met opposition, and violence, in many corners. The civil rights banner, originally taken up by blacks, began to be waved by groups of women as well, demanding an end to their status as "second-class citizens." As the decade progressed, student opposition to U.S. involvement in Vietnam spread to "middle America," and the peace movement became a national grassroots cause.

Meanwhile, throughout the world, nations that had been part of Europe's colonial empire began to assert their independence. In the 1960s the United Nations admitted forty-three new members to its ranks. Newly established nationalist regimes, often authoritarian, realized that they could play the U.S.-Soviet competition to their advantage. These largely non-developed nations began to be referred to as the "Third World." (The United States and its allies were dubbed the "First World," the Soviet Union and its allies, the "Second World.") Political and economic competition for Third World loyalties began to play an increasing role in the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

U.S. and Soviet leaders began to realize that as major world powers in possession of highly destructive weapons arsenals, they had a responsibility to try to reach some agreement to control the growth of the spiraling arms race. Their willingness to negotiate was also motivated by a growing appreciation that as stable industrial world powers they had certain mutual interests, such as a desire to keep the spread of nuclear weapons from unstable, unpredictable regimes throughout the world. Finally, leaders of both nations faced populations that were demanding increased government spending in non-military sectors of society. Agreement to control the growth of weapons development meant that both nations could devote a larger portion of their budgets to the growth of the consumer economy (in the Soviet Union) and to educational and social welfare programs (in the United States).

Among the arms control agreements signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1960s were the following:

*The "Hot Line" Agreement of 1963:* This established a Direct Communications Link between Washington, D.C. and Moscow in an attempt to lessen the danger of a war breaking out from error or misunderstanding. It was modernized to include satellite communication in 1971.

*Limited Test Ban Treaty, 1963:* This agreement banned nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. Underground nuclear explosions were also prohibited if they produced radioactive debris outside the nation conducting the test. In addition to the United States and the Soviet Union, 106 other nations have signed the treaty; fifteen others have signed but not ratified it.

*Outer Space Treaty, 1967:* This accord prohibits the installation of military facilities or weapons on celestial bodies, as well as the placing in orbit of any objects carrying nuclear weapons of mass destruction. In addition to the United States and the Soviet Union, seventy-one countries have signed this treaty; sixty-eight others have ratified it or acceded to its terms.

*Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, with Protocols I and II, 1968:* An extension of an earlier treaty signed by the United States but not by the U.S.S.R., this agreement makes Latin America a nuclear-free zone. The agreement has been signed by twenty-two countries and ratified or acceded to by another nineteen.

*Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1968:* One of the decade's most important accords, this treaty forbids states that possess nuclear weapons to transfer nuclear explosives to any non-nuclear-weapon state. Each state not in possession of nuclear weapons agrees not to acquire explosives on its own. More than one hundred nations have either ratified or acceded to the treaty.

## A Thaw in the Cold War—Detente: 1972-1979

There were many contributing factors to the relaxation of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union in the early 1970s.

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I), begun in 1969, produced the most comprehensive arms con-

### What Is Arms Control?

**(Reprinted from ACDA publication *ARMS CONTROL, Moving Toward World Security*)**

**In the nuclear age, arms control is a way of looking at national security to fit the fact that we can no longer assure the physical protection of our country. Trying to build forces that outstrip adversaries on the one hand, or simply getting rid of one's weapons on the other, will not make war disappear; either may invite war.**

**Arms control may include arms reduction, but it includes much more. It does not assume that arms, by themselves, cause war; but it seeks to size and structure military forces so as to make their use less likely. A nation may pursue this goal through unilateral actions or tacit or formal agreements. One of the objectives of (arms control negotiations) is to reach agreements between the two superpowers that will ensure that their strategic nuclear forces will be used for deterrence only and never for war.**

Arms control also means efforts to make war less likely by restraining the spread of arms to new areas, as in the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, the Seabed Arms Control Treaty of 1971.

Arms control means measures to limit the destructiveness of wars that may be fought despite all efforts to prevent them. A case in point is the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972, outlawing the development, production, and stockpiling of biological and toxic weapons. Another example is the Geneva Protocol of 1925, an agreement that prohibits the use of poison gas in warfare.

Arms control may mean limiting the development or deployment of new types of weapons that would increase the risks of war, as in the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty of 1972—with its limitations on new technical developments—and the 1974 Vladivostok understanding to limit the number of U.S. and Soviet missiles that can carry MIRVs (Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicles). Arms control may inhibit weapons testing, as in the Limited (nuclear) Test Ban Treaty of 1963; on the other hand, it may favor some advances in weapons technology, such as those that make missiles less prone to accidental launching and less vulnerable to surprise attack, because these advances would make for a more stable deterrent force.

Arms control may include disarmament steps that reduce military forces in a balanced and coordinated manner so that at no time in the process would an adversary be tempted to take advantage through new offensive actions. The Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) negotiations in Europe provide an example.

Arms control means creating new opportunities for opposing sides to understand each other more fully at tense moments, to lessen the chance of accidental war or war that might arise from misunderstanding in time of crisis. The "Hot Line" Agreement of 1963 was such a step.

Arms control means finding ways to prevent the spread of deadly nuclear weapons to more nations while still permitting the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, as in the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Arms control means efforts that nations may make on their own or by unwritten, tacit agreement. These may be just as important as signed treaties and executive agreements. What matters is the impact of a given measure in decreasing the likelihood of war and decreasing its destructiveness should it, despite all our efforts, occur.



*The signing of SALT I in Moscow in May 1972 marked the beginning of detente and a new era in arms control.*
Photo: National Archives

trol agreement thus far. When President Richard Nixon traveled to Moscow in May 1972 to sign the treaty, he became the first U.S. president to officially visit the Soviet capital. The event was of great symbolic importance to the developing U.S.-Soviet relationship, bringing with it a return to the personal diplomacy that had not characterized U.S.-Soviet relations since World War II.

Henry Kissinger, Nixon's national security affairs advisor and later secretary of state, was an historian who had chronicled the European empire building of the 19th century. It was Kissinger's belief that world peace would have a better chance if the nations of the world, including the United States and the Soviet Union, would increase their economic interdependence and thus their stake in maintaining stable world relations.

In addition, the continually shifting loyalties of newly independent Third World nations made U.S. leaders realize that every country that was anti-American was not necessarily pro-Soviet, and that even those countries that courted the Soviet brand of socialism would not necessarily remain in that camp for long. This realization brought with it a more realistic view of Soviet influence abroad and lessened American fears of a worldwide communist takeover.

Another factor was the experience of the Vietnam War, which caused many Americans to return to a sense of international isolationism and which resulted in demands for military budget cuts. This attitude was conducive to the establishment of a "live and let live" attitude toward the Soviets. In 1972 only 39 percent of Americans polled by Potomac Associates felt the United States should maintain a "number one" position in the world at all costs, including war.

In the Soviet Union, citizens were demanding more and better consumer goods. The Soviet economy was increasingly strained by the competing demands on it and by its own inefficiency. Soviet leaders hoped that better relations and increased trade with the United States would result in the investment of Western capital in the Soviet economy and in the modernization of some of its industries.

During the period of detente, intercultural and scientific exchanges and trade greatly increased between the superpowers. More than a dozen agreements were signed to foster increased communication. Direct air service from Washington to Moscow was initiated. The most ambitious bilateral effort, the joint Apollo-Soyuz space mission, resulted in a space rendezvous between the two powers that was televised for the entire world to witness.

As the decade progressed, however, relations between the superpowers became increasingly strained. It seemed clear that each side had a different interpretation of detente and therefore had different expectations for it. The Americans expected detente to exert a moderating influence on Soviet foreign policy around the world. It was as if the U.S. leadership were saying to the Soviets: "If you want to remain our friend, you won't do things you know we won't like." The United States, for instance, felt the Soviet Union violated the "spirit of detente" by providing arms to leftist guerillas in Nicaragua and by attempting to increase its influence in Africa. The Soviets, on the other hand, considered detente to be a bilateral relationship between the Americans and themselves that had little to do with their international conduct elsewhere. In response to U.S. charges that they jeopardized detente by their African and Central American activities, the Soviets counter-charged that the United States was interfering in Soviet internal affairs. "Friendship between equals," the Soviets seemed to say, "is not a matter of one side's doing the other's bidding."

As the 1970s progressed, world events that had originally made Americans more amenable to the rapprochement now made them want to reassert American preeminence in the world.

When a small group of student terrorists seized the

*During era of warmer U.S.-Soviet relations, Communist Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and President Richard Nixon meet in the White House under portrait of George Washington and in the Kremlin under portrait of Lenin.*
Photo: National Archives

American embassy in Iran and held the Americans there captive, fear that the United States had become a "toothless giant" created support for the "remilitarization" of the nation. Soon the military began to release figures indicating that the United States had not kept pace with the Soviets in arms spending. Although the assumptions used in compiling the figures were questioned, the press increasingly reported the existence of a "spending gap." When the Soviets entered Afghanistan in support of the socialist regime there, militarily suppressing the widespread dissent, the last vestiges of detente disappeared. (Soviet leaders have said they believed detente was dead before Afghanistan, killed by increasingly militant, anti-Soviet sentiment in the United States.) President Carter imposed an embargo on the shipment of American grain to the Soviets and refused to allow U.S. participation in the 1980 Olympics held in Moscow.

### Return to the Cold War?: 1980-

By the 1980 U.S. presidential election, detente had few vocal supporters in America. In the Kremlin, Leonid Brezhnev, the most powerful Soviet leader in support of detente, was dying. In both countries more militant, hawkish factions seemed to be gaining control of the debate over the direction in which U.S.-Soviet relations should proceed. The SALT II treaty, the most visible symbol of cooperative arms control efforts between the two nations, had been withdrawn from Senate consideration after strong Senate opposition had threatened its ratification and after the Soviets had sent troops to Afghanistan.

The election of Ronald Reagan, known for his "hard-line" views on dealing with the Soviets, had many implications for U.S.-Soviet relations already at a critical point. The Soviets had long been frustrated by the continual shifts in U.S. foreign policy positions, a result of American electoral politics. Soviet diplomats in this country have often complained that just as they have negotiated an agreement with one administration, it loses an election and they have to start from scratch with the new team. When electoral changes bring in administrations with vastly different perspectives on U.S.-Soviet relations (which happened in 1976 and again in 1980) it becomes particularly difficult to salvage anything from the previous four years of bargaining.

President Reagan's key appointments in the areas of foreign policy and military policy were people who shared his commitment to taking a hard line with the Soviet Union. Believing that the United States should negotiate from a position of strength, and that it had lost some of that strength during detente, the new administration made plans to greatly increase both the U.S. conventional and nuclear weapons inventories. The Reagan administration also sought to weaken the

Soviet hand by refusing to allow American firms to sell the Soviets high technology goods and other materials needed for Soviet economic development. When U.S. leaders tried to pressure Western Europe to follow its lead, however, it met with resistance. Most of America's NATO allies continue to believe that their economic and military security is enhanced by detente-like trade and diplomatic negotiations with the Soviets.

Throughout the twentieth century both nations have assumed the worst about each other's intentions. Whether or not those perceptions were accurate in the past, whether or not they are accurate today, seems to matter little. The hostile assumptions are a long way from being dispelled on either side of the globe. Because intentions are so difficult to gauge, both countries continue to focus, perhaps too heavily, on each other's capabilities, principally in terms of military strength. However, even capabilities, though more concrete than intentions, are subject to great debate. Both nations know much about the number and quality of their opponent's weapons. But they remain concerned with what they do not know. And it is largely for that unknowable future that they plan. As long as the United States and the Soviet Union possess the capability to destroy each other, the massive effort required to maintain a military balance will continue to dominate their relationship. But that primary activity goes on within the context of economic, cultural, and diplomatic relations. It is those areas that provide the most flexibility for movement toward greater understanding. It is those areas that were most active throughout the period of detente and that have come to a virtual standstill with the renewal of Cold War-type tensions.

One thing remains certain. With their great size, large populations, and imposing industrial strength, both the United States and the Soviet Union will continue to dominate the world political scene for some time. That scene is one in which the problems of world poverty, dwindling and polluted resources, and terrorism appear to be increasing. Cooperation between the two superpowers might offer at least partial solutions to those problems. Is peaceful coexistence between the United States and the Soviet Union possible? Or are these giants destined to destroy themselves and much of the world with them? Alexis de Tocqueville may have predicted the problem 150 years ago, but he did not predict the outcome.

## Summary

- In November 1917 leaders came to power in the Soviet Union committed to the principles of communism and world revolution. U.S. and British leaders opposed the new Bolshevik regime because it took Russia out of World War I and because they felt threatened by the revolutionary propaganda.

- Between World War I and World War II both the Soviet Union and the United States focused their attention inward. The Soviet Union underwent intense industrialization and modernization, but at great hardship to many of its people. The United States retreated from world affairs into a period of isolationism. After a temporary period of prosperity after World War I, the United States suffered a long economic depression. During this time trade continued between the two nations.

- During World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union fought on the same side, against the Germans and the Japanese. When peace was at hand, however, the former allies became enemies. The Soviet Union took control of the governments in Eastern Europe using its military might to enforce its will. The United States gained unprecedented influence in Western Europe, using its economic power to rebuild Europe into an anti-Soviet bloc.

- In 1962, after a decade of non-communication, the United States and the Soviet Union found themselves locked in a battle of wills. The Soviets had placed nuclear missiles and bombers in Cuba, ninety miles from the U.S. shore. After a very tense week during which the threat of nuclear war hung over the world, the Soviets removed the missiles. The incident had important consequences: a) the Soviets became committed to building a nuclear weapons arsenal to rival that of the Americans, and b) both nations realized they had to increase communications and begin arms control negotiations.

- In the 1960s the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union "thawed" slightly as the countries successfully negotiated a number of arms control agreements. However, competition for influence in newly independent Third World nations increased.

- In 1972 President Nixon's visit to Moscow and the signing of the SALT I treaty there signalled the official beginning of a period of peaceful coexistence, or detente, between the United States and the Soviet Union. During detente, many scientific and cultural exchanges took place and trade greatly increased. The United States principally hoped to gain foreign policy benefits from detente, the Soviet Union hoped to gain economic benefits.

- Detente began to deteriorate as the expectations that both nations had for it were not met. Another major arms control agreement was negotiated, but met great opposition in the United States. The Soviets continued to attempt to aggressively spread their influence throughout the world. In retaliation, the United States restricted the economic exchanges and trade on which the Soviets had counted. Anti-detente factions in both countries became more powerful and Cold War propaganda increased in both countries. By 1980 detente was dead.

- Current relations between the Soviet Union and the United States focus on nuclear weapons. Although there has been little progress in conducting arms control negotiations in recent years, there is some evidence that this is beginning to change. In the West a powerful grassroots movement to "freeze" the nuclear arms race at its current level has developed. In the Soviet Union economic problems provide an incentive to control the costly arms race.

# A Critical Issue: The Arms Race

**IDEAS TO CONSIDER WHILE YOU READ**

- How has the development of nuclear weapons changed the U.S.-Soviet relationship?
- What are the strengths and weaknesses of land-based missiles, submarine-launched missiles, and missiles dropped from bombers?
- What is meant by "deterrence"?
- Did the concept of "mutual assured destruction" provide adequate deterrence?
- Why did the concept of "mutual assured destruction" give way to the doctrine of "flexible response"?
- Given their past actions in the arms race, is it likely that the United States and the Soviet Union would be content with a "tie," or equality, in the race?
- According to Robert McNamara, what effect have American and Soviet perceptions of each other's military strength had on the arms race? Were these perceptions accurate?

*The entire purpose of the American nuclear arsenal is to influence the behavior of six or seven Soviet leaders. As an educational system, it has the highest per-pupil cost of any in the world.*

Richard J. Barnet

*Adequate words are lacking to express the full seriousness of our present situation. It is not just that we are for the moment on a collision course politically with the Soviet Union, and that the process of rational communication between the two governments seems to have broken down completely; it is also—and even more importantly—the fact that the ultimate sanction behind the conflicting policies of these two governments is a type and volume of weaponry which could not possibly be used without utter disaster for us all.*

George F. Kennan, former ambassador to Russia

In May 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union signed a treaty that declared their intention "to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament." Eleven years later, it is clear that both sides have failed to achieve that goal. Why has a cessation in the nuclear arms race been so elusive? How did we get to the point where both nations, while declaring their desire for a reduction in arms, continue to add hundreds of weapons a year to their arsenals?

## The Current State of the Arms Race

### *The U.S. Strategic Triad*

U.S. nuclear defense is based on a triadic, or three-legged, system: air, land, and sea. The air leg of the triad is formed by the 376 bombers capable of delivering nuclear weapons to targets anywhere in the world. The triad's land-based leg is made up of 1,053 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), housed in silos in the continental United States, designed to fly long distances to reach their targets. The final leg of the triad is the group of 616 missiles launched from submarines, or submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Each leg of the triad has unique strengths and weaknesses. The submarines carrying SLBMs, for example, are extremely mobile; their positions are nearly impossible to detect, and they are therefore very secure. However, this flexibility results in less accuracy. The ICBMs, on the other hand, are extremely accurate, yet their fixed positions make them "sitting ducks" for

Soviet missiles. Bombers, the oldest element of the triad, are flexible in their targeting, but are slower than ICBMs or SLBMs and risk being detected by Soviet radar. New technological developments, such as Stealth, promise to enhance the ability of bombers to penetrate Soviet air space undetected.

The majority of U.S. missiles are MIRVed; that is, each missile is equipped with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs). Each MIRV missile has the capability of hitting a number of different targets; therefore one MIRV missile has the destructive power of several non-MIRV missiles. Of the 1,053 U.S. land-based ICBMs, the 550 Minuteman III missiles each possess up to three MIRVs. The proposed MX (Peacekeeper) missile would be equipped with up to ten MIRVs. The U.S. SLBM arsenal is likewise MIRVed, with each of the Poseidon missiles capable of carrying up to fourteen MIRVs (although most currently carry ten). The newer, more accurate Trident weapons are also equipped with MIRV missiles.

### *The Soviet Nuclear Arsenal*

The Soviets possess a large number of SLBMs (more than 950) although a much smaller percentage of their missiles possess MIRVs than do U.S. SLBMs. Their arsenal also includes 145 strategic bombers, as well as 200 Backfire bombers capable of reaching the United States with refueling. The Soviets depend heavily on 1,398 land-based ICBMs for their nuclear defense. Because they have traditionally been behind the United States in missile accuracy (although the gap has narrowed considerably), the Soviets have concentrated on building "heavy" warheads, capable of imposing more widespread devastation.

The Soviets have built the world's strongest air defense system. They have also devoted substantial resources to improving their ballistic missile defenses. Although the current antiballistic missile (ABM) system in Moscow could not cope with a massive attack, the Soviets are in the process of building a much expanded phased-array ABM radar system in the Moscow area. Such a system is allowed under the 1972 ABM Treaty as long as it remains within the technical limits set by the treaty.

### *In the Beginning*

The world got its first glimpse of the tremendously devastating power of atomic weapons on August 6, 1945, when the United States dropped an atomic bomb on the city of Hiroshima in Japan. With that demonstration, the United States became the world's first and only nuclear power. However, its nuclear arsenal was small, as was the number of aircraft capable of delivering the weapons. The strategic policy for using the weapons called for dropping them on industrial, urban areas needed by an enemy to support its war effort. Had the United States used atomic weapons against the Soviet Union during this period, it would have targeted the few large Soviet cities that then existed.

In 1949, the Soviet Union joined the nuclear movement by successfully testing its first atomic bomb. In so doing, the Soviets established that they had developed the necessary technology, but it would remain some


**TRIADS COMPARED STATISTICALLY**

time before they had the necessary number of bombs and delivery vehicles to pose a credible nuclear threat. In the meantime, they relied on the strength of their large ground forces.

*American Nuclear Supremacy in the 1950s*

The 1950s constituted a new low in U.S.-Soviet relations. With American fear of world communist domination fueled by the fall of the Nationalists in China, the Korean War, the McCarthy Communist-hunting hearings, and the Soviets' suppression of dissent in Hungary, an intense anti-Soviet fervor grew in the United States. Fighting political instability after the death of Stalin and facing an economy virtually destroyed by World War II, the Soviets viewed the atomic bomb-dropping Americans as the real threat to world peace and their own existence.

### Why the Arms Race Spirals Upwards

By former secretary of defense Robert McNamara

**(from a *Washington Post* interview of August 1, 1982)**

Go back to 1960 when many in the United States believed there was a missile gap favoring the Soviets. With hindsight it became clear there wasn't any missile gap. But (President) Kennedy had been told there was. What actually happened was this: In the summer of 1960, there were two elements in the U.S. intelligence community disagreeing on the relative levels of the U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces. One element greatly overstated the level of the Soviet nuclear force. When one looked over the data, it didn't justify this conclusion. And within two years of that time, the advantage in the U.S. warhead inventory was so great vis-a-vis the Soviets that the Air Force was saying that they felt we had a first-strike capability and could, and should, continue to have one. If the Air Force thought that, imagine what the Soviets thought. And assuming they thought that, how would you expect them to react? The way they reacted was by substantially expanding their strategic nuclear weapons program.

Now, when they did that, we sat back here and saw the way they were moving—and we always had to take account of their capability more than their intentions, because we were not sure of their intentions—we looked at their capability and they were building submarines, missiles, and planes, and experimenting with new warheads, at such a rate that we had to respond. We probably over-responded because it is likely that their capability, which we observed, exceeded their intentions. So you have an action-reaction phenomenon. And the result is that during the last twenty-five years, and particularly during the last fifteen, there has been a huge build-up, much more than people realize, in the nuclear strength of these two forces. That has changed the nature of the problem and increased the risk greatly.

Throughout the 1950s, the United States remained the only country with a nuclear arsenal of any size. Both resources and technology prevented the Soviets from developing a comparable force. But the Soviets maintained their huge army, which many in the West feared was capable of sweeping through Western Europe. The standoff became U.S. nuclear arms versus Soviet conventional (or non-nuclear) forces. Thus the United States was seen as providing a protective "nuclear umbrella" over Western Europe and its other allies.

During this period, the United States continued to target most of its nuclear weapons against highly populated Soviet industrial centers. Although some military strategists advised targeting more Soviet weapons centers and forces, there were technical arguments against doing so. Principally, the United States did not have adequate information about the precise locations of Soviet forces, and U.S. nuclear weapons did not yet have the high degree of accuracy that would be necessary to count on hitting the much smaller *counterforce* targets.

Had a nuclear war developed during the 1950s, all assumed that it would be over quickly, in a short, incredibly destructive spasm. The possibility of such a war's occurring was heightened by the almost total lack of communication between the world's two strongest powers.

When the Soviet Union successfully launched its Sputnik satellite in 1957, Americans were shocked and frightened. The placing of a satellite in space indicated that the Soviets had developed the capacity to launch missiles in a long-distance trajectory. They were now capable of sending missiles from Soviet soil to hit targets on U.S. soil. U.S. leaders feared the worst. In the United States, an unprecedented effort was begun to "match the Soviets in space." The mating of military and industrial efforts during this period formed the basis of what came to be known in the United States as the "military-industrial complex." History has shown that the U.S. reaction was in fact an overreaction. The Soviets may have successfully launched a satellite, but they had neither the launchers nor the missiles to pose a serious nuclear threat to the United States. This was to be the first of several times when U.S. leaders would credit the Soviet Union with strength it did not possess, and would then proceed to develop a military capacity that far outstripped that of their adversary.

*The Soviets "Catch Up" in the 1960s*

The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 (see page 21) caught both nations by surprise. The United States was enraged to learn that the Soviet Union had installed nuclear missiles and bombers a mere ninety miles from the U.S. border. Having nuclear weapons only minutes away, rather than the hours it would take for Soviet aircraft to carry bombs from the Soviet Union, posed an



*An American Navy jet tracks a Soviet reconnaissance plane as it nears a U.S. aircraft carrier in the North Pacific.*
Photo: Wide World Photo

extremely serious threat to U.S. security. The Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, seemed just as surprised that a move that he had apparently designed for political effect had brought the two nations to the brink of nuclear war. The Soviet Union did not possess, in 1962, a nuclear arsenal sufficient to force the United States to tolerate behavior it considered unacceptable. Khrushchev was forced to back down. The crisis resulted in international embarrassment for the Soviets and helped lead to Khrushchev's ouster by the triumvirate that succeeded him.

The new Soviet leaders were determined to devote whatever national resources were needed to build a nuclear arsenal that could compete with that of the United States. They resolved that the Soviet Union would achieve equal diplomatic status in the world as a "superpower" and believed that having a nuclear arsenal comparable to the Americans' was necessary to gain that recognition.

As both Soviet and U.S. nuclear arsenals increased, it became clear that neither side could disarm the other so completely in a first strike that the attacked nation would not have enough retaliatory power to impose unacceptably extensive damage on the attacker. This logic, that neither side could attack without itself being destroyed, became known as mutual assured destruction, or MAD.

The declared strategic policy under MAD was that each nation would target the other's cities, thereby holding the population and industrial base of each country "hostage." Destroying the Soviet and American societies was obviously "unthinkable," and therefore the concept of MAD was believed to make war "unthinkable." In fact, however, as U.S. technology and intelligence about Soviet forces progressed, more and more Soviet forces were targeted, and some defense planners began to talk about developing the ability to hit only military targets. Such an approach had the appeal of sparing millions of lives while still giving an American president the option of using nuclear force against the Soviets. A big question remained over whether or not such a conflict could remain limited, or whether it would inevitably escalate to an all-out nuclear holocaust. If Soviet technology did not allow weapons to be directed against very precise targets, the only Soviet options in a "limited" nuclear exchange would be to surrender or to use their own weapons against major U.S. cities. Therefore, the logic of mutual assured destruction remained the principal deterrent to nuclear war throughout the decade.

### *Strategic Equality:*
### *A Bitter Pill for the United States in the 1970s*

In February 1970, President Richard Nixon, appearing before the U.S. Congress, questioned the wisdom of relying solely on the "hostage population" deterrent of MAD.

> Should a president, in the event of a nuclear attack, be left with the single option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians, in the face of the certainty that it would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans? Should the concept of assured destruction be narrowly defined, and should it be the only measure of our ability to deter the variety of threats we may face?

Nixon was thus laying the groundwork for U.S.

declaratory strategic policy to more closely match its actual policy of targeting forces in addition to cities.

But many in the strategic policy community questioned the wisdom of moving away from MAD, with its "nuclear war is unthinkable" quality. With MAD a finite number of weapons would assure a nation's survival. Defense planners could calculate the number of nuclear weapons needed to destroy the enemy's population and industrial base; the prospect of such devastation acted as the deterrent to nuclear war. Additional nuclear weapons were therefore unnecessary. With *counterforce targeting*, however, nations would require unlimited nuclear arsenals, for limited nuclear exchanges could in theory continue until one side ran out of nuclear weapons. Of particular concern was the potential size of the military budget if the United States were to shift to an avowedly counterforce strategy.

However, as the debate progressed in the United States, the Soviet Union was continuing to increase and upgrade its own nuclear forces. As the Soviets increased the accuracy of their missiles to a point approaching that of American missiles, their own counterforce abilities increased. It was only logical that the Soviets would increasingly target weapons sites as the Americans were doing.



*Developments in ballistic missile technology have greatly increased the accuracy of U.S. ICBMs and SLBMs.*

### *Plotting the Course for the 1980s*

Many questions face strategic planners in the 1980s. Are U.S. land-based missiles critically vulnerable? Should the United States build a less vulnerable land-based missile system or rely more heavily on the sea and air legs of the strategic triad? Who is to determine when the arms race is "tied," when strategic parity has been achieved? Will the Soviets be satisfied with parity, or will they continue to increase their weapons arsenal in an attempt to achieve superiority? Will both nations develop ballistic missile defense systems that render each other's missiles useless, thereby launching a new arms race, with space-based lasers and killer satellites replacing ICBMs and SLBMs?

These are questions to which there are no answers at present, only competing guesses. U.S. and Soviet leaders will choose among those guesses and plan their defense strategies accordingly.

In the past, the arms race was driven by a combination of forces. Lack of correct information about the capabilities and intentions of their opponents drove both sides to develop and stockpile bigger and more destructive nuclear weapons. Added to that was the role played by technological developments, which at pivotal points changed the nature of weapons and generated new surges in the arms race. Since neither of these forces has significantly changed, it is reasonable to assume that the arms race will continue to be driven by them.

The debate will continue over whether national security is better served by having a nuclear weapons strategy that makes war "unthinkable" or one that plans to fight a war and win. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the United States cannot pursue one route while the Soviet Union pursues another. Both nations will continue to develop war-fighting nuclear capabilities in the 1980s. Nuclear weapons will be viewed in a more conventional way, much as tanks and machine guns were in the past. But the power and potential devastation of nuclear weapons dwarf the weapons of the past. Whether or not a nuclear exchange meant to be "limited" can in fact remain limited, or whether any nuclear exchange will lead to all-out nuclear holocaust as envisioned in the 1960s, remains an unanswerable question.

Perhaps the most fundamental question remains: Can the two most powerful countries on earth harness the technological genie that broke out of the bottle in 1945? If they cannot develop a strategy to control the technology, instead allowing the technology to drive the strategy as in the past, then the arms race will undoubtedly continue to dominate U.S.-Soviet relations.


STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES

## Summary

■ Both U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals are made up of three types of weapons: land-based missiles, submarine-launched missiles, and missiles dropped from bombers.

■ The Soviets have more missiles than the United States, but U.S. missiles are more accurate than Soviet missiles. The United States has far more bombers than does the Soviet Union, but the Soviets have the best air defense system in the world. Most U.S. and Soviet defense planners believe that the two nations have reached "essential equivalence" in the arms race. This means that, although the weapons systems of the two cannot be compared exactly, their overall capabilities of inflicting damage are roughly equal.

■ In the 1950s, the United States had unquestioned superiority over the Soviets in nuclear arms. During the 1960s, the Soviets devoted great effort to developing a credible nuclear force. In the 1970s, technological advances allowed both nations to greatly modernize their nuclear weapons arsenals. However, U.S. domestic pressures placed a restraint on the economic resources the United States could devote to arms modernization. In the 1980s, the United States has resumed its nuclear arsenal modernization. The superpowers appear to be at a point at which new arms control accords can be negotiated, or a new phase in the arms race can be entered.

■ *Deterrence* is a concept that means that one nation is prevented, or deterred, from attacking another nation because it fears the results of such an attack. In the 1960s the basis of deterrence was a doctrine called mutual assured destruction (MAD). During the era of mutual assured destruction, the United States and the Soviet Union had enough missiles targeted at each other's cities and industrial centers to ensure that if one were attacked, it would have enough missiles left to destroy the attacker's society.

■ Technological advances in nuclear technology in the late 1960s made it possible for the United States and the Soviet Union to target weapons sites rather than entire cities. While this strategy had the advantage of sparing large portions of a society's population in time of war, it has been criticized by some as encouraging the outbreak of war. Some analysts believe that deterrence does not work as well when a nation's leaders do not have to fear the assured destruction of their society.

# In Pursuit of Peace

### IDEAS TO CONSIDER WHILE YOU READ

The following articles have been written by U.S. leaders who have watched the U.S.-Soviet relationship for a long time. Some of their observations are the same, some are different. If you can answer the following questions after reading this section, you have understood what each author has tried to express.

- Why does Senator Matsunaga believe that space is a good arena for U.S.-Soviet cooperation?
- In what ways does Senator Matsunaga believe a space cooperation agreement fosters better U.S.-Soviet relations than an arms control agreement?
- What disadvantages to cooperating in space does Senator Matsunaga cite? Can you think of others?
- What benefits did the United States and the Soviet Union gain by cooperating in space during the Apollo-Soyuz project?
- In 1957 General Bradley predicted that the arms race would lead to what end? Have the past twenty-six years proven him right or wrong?
- What hope does General Bradley see for overcoming the threat to civilization posed by a spiraling arms race?
- According to Ambassador Kennan, what political actions should the United States continue to expect from the Soviet Union?
- How will the new generation of Soviet leaders differ from the current leadership?
- What traits does Ambassador Kennan feel American foreign policymakers and the American press have to overcome before a stable U.S.-Soviet relationship can be achieved?
- Which authors believe that "time is running out" for Americans and Soviets to learn to live together in peace?

No one knows the future of the world. Some predict nuclear devastation, chaos, and horror. Others foresee a return to the decentralized village life of the past. Still others predict the rise of a world government. Some people plan for the arrival of extraterrestrials while there are those who would have us be the ones to conquer other worlds.

The doomsayers' predictions of an imminent end to the world have been with us for centuries, along with the optimism of countless generations that continue to bring new life into the world in the hope that one of the young will find a way to secure peace or end hunger or otherwise improve the quality of life.

When we think of the future of the world, we naturally think about the fragile, usually hostile relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. These two superpowers possess the ability to eliminate each other's populations from the face of the earth along with much of the rest of the world. They possess nuclear weapons arsenals of sufficient strength to end life on this planet as we know it.

The same two nations have enormous power to promote progress on earth. Both have the resources to further medical advances, to explore space, and to end world hunger. Both can confront the problems of dwindling energy resources, worldwide deforestation, and water shortages.

Will the U.S.-Soviet relationship move toward a nuclear war or toward peaceful collaboration in facing world problems? In this section, distinguished U.S. leaders give their opinions of the direction in which U.S.-Soviet relations should proceed.

*Spark Matsunaga is the junior senator from Hawaii. In the following article, which first appeared in the* Washington Post, *he suggests that the greatest progress is made in U.S.-Soviet relations when the two powers are working on an important shared project, when getting things to work is more important than politics. Senator Matsunaga believes that space provided just such an opportunity before and that it continues to provide an arena for mutually beneficial cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union.*

## Find Peace With Russia in Space

### Change the Rules: Joint Space Stations Would Work Wonders

*By Spark Matsunaga*

Our best—and perhaps last—opportunity to reach a workable accommodation with the Soviets appears on the verge of being lost before it is properly recognized.

While disarmament talks and negotiations must necessarily continue, the greatest opportunity appears to lie not in the narrow confines of a conference room but in the reaches of space. Within this decade, the United States and the Soviet Union plan to build permanent manned space stations. The age of space colonization, which scientists say will be comparable to the time when life emerged from the sea to colonize the land, will have begun.

But why two hostile space stations? Space—the last and most expansive frontier—will be what we make it. Must we make it into another "real world" living on the brink of self-annihilation? Must we play the same old unwinnable game in space, too?

A more appealing alternative, it seems to me, is to seek to make the first orbiting space station a weapons-free international project involving the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as other interested nations having a space capability.

Reaching agreement with the Soviets on this won't be easy, but as a policy objective it is probably far more attainable than any tension-reducing alternative available here on earth.

Space is virgin territory, insofar as weapons are concerned.

By converting what must otherwise inevitably become the first space weapons platforms into a joint project, the Americans and the Soviets would, for the first time, decisively interrupt the suicidal process that has captured them. Even more significantly, we would begin turning that process around, by learning to work together in a challenging environment, as is perhaps only now possible in space. In that context, the dramatically successful Apollo-Soyuz mission of 1975 is worth recalling.

The project was sealed by a space cooperation agreement signed by President Nixon and Premier Kosygin in Moscow on May 24, 1972. Two days later, Nixon and Kosygin signed a strategic arms pact.

The two documents bore an instructive difference. Whereas the strategic arms pact called for open-ended discussion in gilded conference rooms, the space agreement involved a no-nonsense design and construction timetable targeted toward a specific objective—a joint docking in space in 1975.

That tangible objective locked both sides into a train of technical imperatives which, in turn, influenced the basic character of their relations.

For instance, initial American requests for information ran up against compulsive Soviet secretiveness. Had they been negotiating over language and analyzing force strengths on the basis of contested definitions, the effort surely would have ended in stalemate. But they had spacecraft to design and build, communications systems to integrate, astronauts to train, joint docking systems, joint tracking systems, joint life-support systems.

As the timetable ticked off, the Soviets opened up to an unprecedented extent. Scientists and technicians from both nations became wholly absorbed in the project, integrating distinctly different operational styles under the pressure of a shared deadline and a shared professional commitment to make the project work.

Thus, in mid-1973, an American delegation was admitted to the previously top secret Soviet mission control center—again, for the technically-required purpose of coordinating communications and tracking. Looking out across the consoles, world maps, wall clocks, they saw, typed on the giant center screen: "WELCOME AMERICAN COLLEAGUES."

The following year, American astronauts lived and trained at the Soviet space center outside Moscow, Soviet cosmonauts trained in Houston, and American public affairs officials successfully sold the Russians on live TV coverage for the event. All were firsts.

Before the project concluded on July 17, 1975, with a successful docking in space, the Soviets and Americans had negotiated and signed 133 working documents—an unprecedented achievement.

Neil Hutchinson, the U.S. flight director of Apollo-Soyuz, summed up what was probably the project's most important contribution and what also turned out to be its greatest frustration for those involved:

> "I wish there was another one of these flights. We've gone to all this trouble to learn how to work with these people.... I could run another Apollo-Soyuz with a heck of a lot less fuss than it took to get this one going."

So no one can say it can't be done. Not only that, but the stage is already set: In the seven years since Apollo-Soyuz, U.S. and Soviet space activities have followed strikingly complementary paths.

The Soviets have concentrated on long-duration space flights aboard orbiting house-trailer Salyut space stations (like our shortlived Skylab) serviced by manned Soyuz spacecraft and unmanned Progress resupply vehicles. Soviet cosmonauts have logged a solid two

*U.S. astronauts Donald Slayton and Thomas Stafford and Soviet cosmonaut Aleksei Leonov aboard the Soviet Soyuz orbital module during the joint U.S.-Soviet Apollo-Soyuz mission in 1975.*
Photo: Wide World Photo

years of spaceflight, including a world record stint of six months.

The United States, meanwhile, has concentrated on quick, easy access with a reusable space vehicle. As the first takeoff-and-landing space vehicle, the shuttle is more sophisticated than anything the Soviets have developed. But flight duration for the shuttle is limited to seven days with present power systems and a maximum of thirty days with adjustments.

Clearly, the Soviet and American space programs are in synch. From the perspectives of science, engineering and economics, both nations would benefit immensely from combining their efforts at this point.

Inevitably, there is the question of politics. The political drawbacks include concern about technology transfer (we are ahead in micro-electronics and computer technology) and the related policy of using cooperation itself as a bargaining chip, like the cruise missile. But in full perspective, the political drawbacks are far outweighed by the advantage of an opportunity to rein in the arms race and redirect its latent energies to meet a new, more inspiring and far more demanding challenge.

A joint project in space would add a refreshingly expansive dimension to life on a planet edging toward self-annihilation.

The arms build-up on planet earth could continue—Trident, MX, CX, BI, RDF, whatever our hearts desire. Arms control negotiation could continue. We might even continue antisatellite weapons testing, since that involves a ground-based Soviet weapon and an American weapon launched in the suborbital atmosphere from an F-16. So we would be protected.

But meanwhile, we also would be working on something with the Soviets. Something big. Something daring, bearing hope for the future.

And if it catches on, if we actually build some common ground up there, begin seeding it, wouldn't it be worth a try?

Tom Stafford, American flight commander for the Apollo-Soyuz, said that when he opened the Apollo hatch to greet his Soviet counterpart, Alexei Leonov, as they spun in orbit 100 miles above the earth, he believed "we were opening back on Earth a new era in the history of man."

We need to give the Staffords and the Leonovs of this world a chance.

*The following speech was given by General of the Army Omar Bradley at the St. Alban's School in Washington, D.C., on November 5, 1957; however, it could have been given today. Does that mean that U.S.-Soviet relations are more stable than they sometimes appear? Or does it mean that we are unable to change things for the better? General Bradley died in 1981 at the age of eighty-eight, still concerned about the issues he addresses below.*

## Address to the Students at St. Alban's School

*By Omar Bradley*

The central problem of our time—as I view it—is how to employ human intelligence for the salvation of mankind. It is a problem we have put upon ourselves. For we have defiled our intellect by the creation of

*During detente, U.S. President Carter and Soviet leader Brezhnev bridge language differences to share a joke. Can U.S. and Soviet Leaders find a way for their nations to coexist peacefully? General Bradley calls it an effort "infinitely more difficult than the conquest of space."*
Photo: National Archives

such scientific instruments of destruction that we are now in desperate danger of destroying ourselves. Our plight is critical and with each effort we have made to relieve it by further scientific advance, we have succeeded only in aggravating our peril.

As a result, we are now speeding inexorably toward a day when even the ingenuity of our scientists may be unable to save us from the consequences of a single rash act or a lone reckless hand upon the switch of an uninterceptable missile. For twelve years now we've sought to stave off this ultimate threat of disaster by devising arms that would be both ultimate and disastrous.

This irony can probably be compounded a few more years, or perhaps even a few decades. Missiles will bring anti-missiles; anti-missiles will bring anti-anti-missiles. But inevitably this whole electronic house of cards will reach a point where it can be constructed no higher.

At that point we shall have come to the peak of this whole incredible dilemma into which the world is shoving itself. And when that time comes there will be little we can do other than to settle down uneasily, smother our fears, and attempt to live in a thickening shadow of death.

Should this situation come to pass, we would have but one single and thin thread to cling to. We call it rationale or reason. We reason that no government, no single group of people—indeed, not even one willful individual—would be so foolhardy, so reckless as to precipitate a war which would most surely end in mutual destruction.

The reasoning may have the benefit of logic. But even logic sometimes goes awry. How can we assume that reason will prevail in a crisis when there is ordinarily so little reason among people? To those who take comfort in the likelihood of an atomic peace to be secured solely by rationale and reason, I would recall the lapse of reason in a bunker under the Reich Chancellery in Berlin. It failed before, it can fail again.

Have we already gone too far in this search for peace through the accumulation of peril? Is there any way to halt this trend—or must we push on with new devices until we inevitably come to judgment before the atom? I believe there is a way out. And I believe I have acquired in my lifetime a decent respect for human intelligence.

It may be that the problems of accommodation in a world split by rival ideologies are more difficult than those with which we have struggled in the construction of ballistic missiles. But I believe, too, that if we apply to these human problems the energy, creativity, and the perseverance we have devoted to science, even problems of accommodation will yield to reason.

Admittedly, the problem of peaceful accommodation in the world is infinitely more difficult than the conquest of space, infinitely more complex than a trip to the moon. But if we will only come to the realization that it must be worked out—whatever it may mean even to such sacred traditions as absolute national sovereignty—I believe that we can somehow, somewhere, and perhaps through some as yet undiscovered world thinker and leader find a workable solution.

*Air Force scientists study the design of a new air-launched cruise missile, the ALCM-B.*
Photo: U.S. Air Force

I confess that this is as much an article of faith as it is an expression of reason. But this, my friends, is what we need, faith in our ability to do what must be done. Without that faith we shall never get started. And until we get started, we shall never know what can be done.

If I am sometimes discouraged, it is not by the magnitude of the problem, but by our colossal indifference to it. I am unable to understand why—if we are willing to trust in reason as a restraint on the use of a ready-made ready-to-fire bomb—we do not make greater, more diligent and more imaginative use of reason and human intelligence in seeking an accord and compromise which will make it possible for mankind to control the atom and banish it as an instrument of war.

This is the real and indeed the most strenuous challenge to man's intellect today. By comparison with it, the conquest of space is of small significance. For until we learn how to live together, until we rid ourselves of the strife that mocks our pretensions of civilization, our adventures in science—instead of producing human progress—will continue to crowd it with greater peril.

We can compete with a Sputnik and probably create bigger and better Sputniks of our own. But what are we doing to prevent the Sputnik from evolving into just one more weapons system? And when are we going to muster an intelligence equal to that applied against the Sputnik and dedicate it to the preservation of this satellite on which we live?

How long—I would ask you—can we put off salvation? When does humanity run out? If enough of us believe strongly enough in the ability of intelligent human beings to get together on some basis of a just accord, we might somehow, somewhere, in some way, and under some auspices make a start on it.

Unless we soon get started, it may be too late. We can't sit about waiting for some felicitous accident of history that may somehow make the world all right. Time is running against us, and it is running against us with the speed of a Sputnik.

If we're going to save ourselves from the instruments of our own intellect, we had better soon get ourselves under control and begin making the world safe for living.

*George F. Kennan has been both a participant in the foreign policy community as well as a long-time observer of it. As a member of the American Foreign Service, he served as minister-counselor in Moscow in 1944 and as ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1952. He is currently professor emeritus at Princeton University's Institute for Advanced Study. Ambassador Kennan has written many articles and books about the Soviet Union. The following article was taken from his most recent book,* The Nuclear Delusion.

## The American-Soviet Relationship: A Retrospective

*By George F. Kennan*

It would be idle to pretend that the prospects for the future of Soviet-American relations are anything less than problematical. Formidable impediments continue to lie across the path of any efforts at improvement. The Soviet authorities will no doubt continue to adhere to internal practices of a repressive nature that will continue to offend large sections of American opinion. They will continue to guard what they consider their right or their duty to subject the United States to periodic rhetorical denunciation and to give to anti-American political factions in Third World countries forms of support that Americans will find unreconcilable with a desire for good relations with this country. They will, rather because they are Russians than because they are Communists, continue to cultivate and maintain armed forces on a scale far greater than any visible threat to their security would seem to warrant. They will continue what they will describe as efforts to achieve parity with the United States in naval and long-range nuclear capabilities; and others will continue to be in doubt as to whether these are not really efforts to achieve a decisive, and irrevocable, superiority. They will continue to hide all their undertakings behind a wholly unnecessary degree of secrecy—a secrecy which invites exaggerated fears on the other side and enhances the very dangers to which it is supposed to

*View of the Kremlin from across the Moscow River. According to Ambassador Kennan, the future Soviet leadership will be more pragmatic and less ideological.*
Photo: Scherrie Goettsch

be responsive. None of this will be helpful to the development of the relationship.

On the other hand, the Soviet leadership has, and will continue to have, a high degree of awareness of the dangers of a continued nuclear competition. Along with all its exaggerated military efforts, it does not want, and will not want, a world war. It has a keen realization of the suicidal nature of any nuclear war; and it has too many internal problems to allow it to wish to assume inordinate risks. It is now governed, furthermore, by a relatively old, habit-worn, and weary bureaucracy, which is going to have to give over in the relatively near future. Waiting in the wings is a new generation of officials who, insofar as one is able to judge them at all, would appear to be no less tough than their elders, no less capable, and certainly no less nationalistic, but more pragmatic, less confined by ideological rigidities, less inhibited in association and converse with foreigners. To which must be added that curious streak of friendly and sometimes even admiring interest in the United States—a mixture of curiosity, eagerness for peaceful rivalry, and sometimes even real liking—that runs through the Soviet population and has never failed to be noted by observant American students of Russian life.

All these factors lend assurance that, given an American policy reasonably adjusted to these contradictions of the official Russian personality and conscious of the immensity of what is at stake in the future of the relationship, there need be no greater danger of apocalyptic disaster arising out of that relationship than there has been in the past—and the United States, after all, has contrived to live in the same world with this regime for over half a century without finding it necessary to resort to arms against it in order to protect American interests. Possibly there could even be a further successful effort to improve things.

But if this is to occur, American statesmanship will have to overcome some of the traits that have handicapped it in the past in dealing with this most unusual, most dangerous, and most serious of all the problems of foreign policy it has ever had to face. It will have to overcome that subjectivity that caused Americans to be strongly pro-Soviet at the height of the



*The U.S. Capitol with the Senate chamber in the foreground. Can U.S. foreign policy meet the challenge of peaceful coexistence with a hostile adversary?*
Photo: Shannon Matheny

Stalin era and equally anti-Soviet in the days of Khrushchev, and to acquire a greater steadiness and realism of vision before the phenomenon of Soviet power. It will have to make greater progress than it has made to date in controlling the compulsions of the military-industrial complex and in addressing itself seriously to the diminution, whether by agreement or by unilateral restraint or both, of the scope and intensity of the weapons race.

American politicians will have to learn to resist the urge to exploit, as a target for rhetorical demonstrations of belligerent vigilance, the image of a formidable external rival in world affairs. And American diplomacy will have to overcome, in greater measure than it has done to date, those problems of privacy of decision and long-term consistency of behavior which, as Toqueville once pointed out, were bound to burden American democracy when the country rose to the stature of a great power. In all of this, American statesmanship will need the support of a press and communications media more serious and less inclined to oversimplify and dramatize in their coverage of American foreign policy, than what we have known in the recent past.

It is not impossible for American government and society to make these advances. To do so, they have only to match the best examples of American statesmanship in the past, but then to give to their achievements, this time, a more enduring commitment and a deeper understanding than was the case at other high moments of American performance.

There is not, however, infinite time for the achievement of these results. Certain of the trends of international life at this moment for which the United States bears a very special responsibility, notably the steady expansion and proliferation of nuclear weaponry and the preposterous development of the export of arms from major industrial countries, are ones which it is impossible to project much farther into the future without inviting catastrophes too apocalyptic to contemplate. The greatest mistake American policymakers could make would be to assume that time is not running out on all of us, themselves included.

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# Glossary

**Anti-ballistic missile (ABM):** Any missile capable of destroying enemy ballistic missiles in flight at short, medium, or long range inside or outside the atmosphere. It may be armed with any sort of weapon (laser, nuclear, conventional).

**Bilateral treaty:** A treaty that exists between two nations and is binding on them alone.

**Bipolar politics:** Politics based on a view of the world as split between two rival camps, those of the United States and the Soviet Union.

**Bolshevik:** The Russian word for "majority." It was originally applied to the majority faction within the Social Democratic Labor Party prior to the Russian Revolution. That faction, headed by Lenin, favored immediate overthrow of the Czarist regime rather than the gradual reform favored by the Mensheviks, or minority faction.

**Capitalism:** An economic system based on private ownership of property, production of goods for profit, and competition among producers. Prices and wages are generally, but not always, related to the supply of and demand for a particular good or service.

**Cold War:** The state of hostilities that has existed between the United States and the Soviet Union since World War II without the actual outbreak of military combat. The weapons used in such a war are primarily economic, diplomatic and rhetorical.

**Command economy:** An economy in which major decisions, such as investment of resources, levels of production and distribution, and prices and wages, are set by a centralized decision-making body. In the Soviet Union such decisions are made by the leaders of the Communist party.

**Communism:** An economic system based on the principle of communal ownership of property, and distribution of goods and services based on each person's need. In the *Communist Manifesto* Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels describe communism as the final stage of socialism in which all class differences would disappear and people would live in harmony. Lenin added the concept of an elite Communist party that would direct the nation's development.

**Counterforce:** A strategy in which a nation targets its weapons against the weapons sites, military installations, and military support systems of its enemy, instead of targeting the enemy's major population centers.

**Demography:** The study of population patterns within a nation. Such patterns may include size, geographic distribution, age distribution, and racial make-up.

**Detente:** A French word meaning "lessening of tension." It was applied to the U.S.-Soviet relationship between 1972 and 1979, when hostile rhetoric was at a minimum and political, cultural, scientific, and economic cooperation were at a height.

**Geopolitical:** Pertaining to a nation's geography, political system and social structure. A combination of geopolitical factors strongly influences the way in which a nation perceives its position in the world.

**Ideological:** Pertaining to ideas that reflect the social needs and goals of a person or group.

**Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM):** A pilotless projectile propelled into space by one or more rocket boosters, capable of traveling 3,000 to 8,000 nautical miles.

**Interdependence:** A relationship in which the parties (in this case, nations) develop mutual interests to a point at which they need each other to successfully meet their individual goals.

**Intermediate range nuclear forces (INF):** Nuclear weapons with a range of 1,500 to 3,000 nautical miles.

**Plenary session:** A session that is fully attended by all qualified members.

**Politburo:** The Political Bureau of the Communist Party, a small group of top party officials who make the most important decisions concerning the direction of Soviet domestic and foreign policy.

**Secularization (of society):** The changing of a society from a religious orientation to a civil or non-religious orientation.

**Socialism:** An economic system in which the state owns the means of production and controls the distribution of goods. According to Marxist-Leninist theory, socialism is a necessary stage in the development of communism.

**Soviet:** The Russian word for "council." Prior to the Russian Revolution such councils were composed of workers and soldiers who favored the overthrow of the Czar. Later they included peasants and became the standard forum for decision-making.

**Submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM):** Any ballistic missile transported by and launched from a ship. It may be short-, medium-, or long-range.

**Union republic:** An administrative district within the Soviet Union that is home to an ethnically homogeneous population and that borders on a foreign country or the Baltic Sea. There are fifteen union republics in the Soviet Union.

**Warhead:** An explosive nuclear device delivered by aircraft and missiles.

# Notes

## CLOSE UP FOUNDATION

The Close Up Foundation is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization dedicated to involving people in the democratic process. CLOSE UP is the largest government studies program in the country, bringing students and teachers to Washington for a week-long learning experience with key national policymakers.

## CLOSE UP PUBLICATIONS

The Close Up Foundation publishes the following books:

- *Perspectives*—a unique book of readings on the processes of American government. Perspectives and insights on Washington policymakers, newsmakers, and others involved in the political process are included. Case studies complement the chapters which include the presidency, the executive branch, the congress, the supreme court and the judiciary, interest groups, the media, the electoral process, and the concept of federalism.
- *Current Issues*—a foreign and domestic policy handbook published yearly. Each chapter includes an introduction, key questions and background information on the subject. A pro-con debate at the end of each chapter makes the book ideal for interesting discussions.
- *Special Focus: Energy*—a 20-page booklet and curriculum guide specially designed to be used with the four-part CLOSE UP televised seminars on energy. The booklet provides background information on nuclear energy, energy environmental issues, renewable energy sources, and a global energy overview.
- *Special Focus: U.S.-Soviet Relations*—a booklet and curriculum guide specially designed to be used with the four-part CLOSE UP televised seminars on U.S.-Soviet Relations. The booklet provides background information on differing world views of the two countries, the evolution of U.S.-Soviet relations, the Arms Race, and the future of U.S.-Soviet Relations.

## CLOSE UP TELEVISED PROGRAMMING

The Close Up Foundation also provides television viewers an opportunity to participate in a close up view of government through television programs carried on the Cable Satellite Public Affairs Network (C-SPAN). These programs focus on specific topics such as energy, U.S.-Soviet relations, law-related topics, and foreign and domestic policy issues.

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**Close Up Foundation**

The Close Up Foundation is a nonprofit, multipartisan organization dedicated to encouraging the involvement of young people in the democratic process. The Close Up Foundation has no affiliation with any branch of government, political party, or interest group. The Foundation's board of advisors includes representatives of both political parties and many political viewpoints.

The Close Up Foundation runs a Washington seminar program that brings high school students and their teachers to the nation's capital for a week-long, on-site learning experience. In the 1983-1984 school year, approximately 17,000 young people and educators will participate in the Close Up Washington experience.

In addition to the Close Up Washington program, the Foundation publishes resource books and materials about American government, including *Perspectives*, a book of original articles written by policymakers and other knowledgeable insiders, and *Current Issues*, readable and balanced summaries of the major issues of the day. Close Up also televises four series of Washington-based seminars for use in classrooms across the country. In addition, the Close Up Foundation sponsors local Close Up programs for studying state and local government, parallel programs for international students and handicapped individuals during the regular sessions, and a teacher program designed to complement the student experience.

For more information about these or other Foundation programs, contact the Close Up Foundation, 1235 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, Virginia 22202.

# Close Up Special Focus:
# U.S.-Soviet Relations

## Curriculum Guide

CloseUp

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## Close Up Foundation Publications and Telecommunications

Since 1979 the Close Up Foundation has been providing schools and communities with the opportunity to participate in a CLOSE UP view of government through its publications and televised seminars. CLOSE UP televised seminars are carried on the Cable-Satellite Public Affairs Network (C-SPAN).

The Special Focus series consists of a publication, four televised seminars with documentary segments, and a curriculum guide. The seminars feature high school participants in the Washington program questioning key policymakers in lively discussions about important issues. The televised portion of the package is funded by **Conoco Inc., a Du Pont Company,** and **R.J.Reynolds Industries, Inc.** The Close Up Foundation has produced three such series: *Special Focus on the Economy, Special Focus on Energy,* and *Special Focus: U.S.-Soviet Relations.*

Additional copies of *Special Focus: U.S.-Soviet Relations* are available at six dollars each with special rates for large orders. Copies of this manual are available at three dollars and fifty cents each. Copies are free with bulk orders of more than thirty texts.

**Executive Editor**
Patricia Bandy

**Assistant Editor for Academic Publications**
Jacqueline Hess

**Production and Design**
Steve Waxman

**Producer, Telecommunications**
Sally LaMotte

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# Curriculum Guide to Close Up Special Focus: U.S.-Soviet Relations

Written by Jacqueline Hess

*CLOSE UP Special Focus: U.S.-Soviet Relations* is a video-print educational unit designed to help students understand the complex relationship between the world's two strongest nations. The unit consists of a booklet, *Special Focus: U.S.-Soviet Relations*, a four-part television series, and a curriculum guide for teachers.

The unit has been divided into four basic sections: 1) Differing World Views; 2) The Evolution of U.S.-Soviet Relations; 3) The Arms Race; and 4) In Pursuit of Peace. The four television programs correspond with these sections. Each includes a ten- to twelve-minute documentary that presents valuable information in an interesting visual manner. The remainder of each thirty-minute program consists of a question-and-answer period between CLOSE UP high school participants and U.S. and Soviet foreign policy experts. The booklet, *Special Focus: U.S.-Soviet Relations*, is also divided into these four sections. Three of the sections are subdivided to make the material easier to present and to understand.

U.S.-Soviet relations is a difficult but important subject to teach. Students who graduate from high school without an understanding of the chief issue that dominates U.S. foreign policy will not be well prepared to act as informed adult citizens.

The subject is a vast one, and it would be impossible to present all pertinent information in a single forum. The *CLOSE UP Special Focus* series concentrates on what we believe are the most important ideas and facts for students to grasp.

The first section of the series, "Differing World Views," explores the geopolitical factors that influence U.S. and Soviet foreign policy. It discusses the geographic location of the superpowers, the nature of their populations, and their economic and political systems. Factually, this is a very dense section. Capitalism and communism are difficult concepts to comprehend. The Soviet political system is a complicated one for even Soviet specialists to understand. The information is presented in as simple a manner as possible without losing important ideas. With a little help, high school students will be able to understand all of the ideas presented. We suggest that teachers work with the information in manageable pieces, using the video and the print to complement each other, and perhaps using additional resources as well. The lesson plans offered in this guide are merely suggestions. There are many other creative ways in which to use the material.

The second section of the series, "The Evolution of U.S.-Soviet Relations," traces the history of the problematic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. In this section, as in the others, we have attempted to provide as objective an account as possible. Perhaps the greatest strength of the *CLOSE UP Special Focus: U.S.-Soviet Relations* series is its effort to present a balanced, objective view of events that are so frequently discussed in a one-sided, emotional way. The Close Up Foundation firmly believes that students should learn that there are many sides to every issue. In its *Perspectives* series, as well as in its other publications, CLOSE UP attempts to present the different perspectives from which an issue may be viewed. It is particularly important that the U.S.-Soviet relationship, so often clouded in bias and emotion, be examined in this manner.

The third section of the series, "The Arms Race," highlights the focal point of U.S.-Soviet relations. We have attempted to concentrate on the fundamental concepts underlying the arms race, rather than on presenting a wealth of numbers that have little meaning in the abstract.

The final section of the series, "In Pursuit of Peace," looks ahead to the prospects for U.S.-Soviet relations in the future. In keeping with CLOSE UP's practice of bringing "first-person" accounts to students, this section offers the viewpoints of long-time, knowledgeable observers of the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

This is the first edition of *CLOSE UP Special Focus: U.S.-Soviet Relations*, and we are extremely interested in receiving feedback from its users. If you would like to share your thoughts or observations about the series, we would greatly appreciate a letter or phone call. We are interested in learning whether or not you found the series useful, how readily it fit into your curriculum, how easily the students understood the material presented, and innovative ways in which you presented the information.

Please address your comments to:

Close Up Foundation
Publications Department
1235 Jefferson Davis Highway
Arlington, Virginia 22202

or call free of charge: (800) 336-5479.

## The Use of Television as a Teaching Tool

Television is a pervasive influence in the lives of today's youth. Most students receive information daily from television, and have been conditioned to accept such information as legitimate.

Students should be encouraged to be more than passive television viewers. This is particularly true when using CLOSE UP television programs. The televised seminars are designed to stimulate classroom discussion.

## Hints for Using Videocassettes in the Classroom

### DO:

- Become familiar with the video equipment. Be able to respond to problems with picture or sound.
- Focus the picture and the audio. Poor quality video or audio will distract students and make your presentation less effective.
- Preview the tape. Decide where to stop the tape for discussion. Using the counter will help you relocate those places while playing the tape for your class.
- Prepare students for the programs with readings and discussions. Encourage students to pursue additional information after they have viewed the programs.
- Stop the tape at appropriate times for discussion. This will help focus students' attention and reinforce concepts learned through reading or discussion.

### DO NOT:

- Turn out the lights.
- View videotapes from the beginning to the end without stopping.
- Allow students to be passive viewers of the program.

## Sample Lesson One: The Importance of Geopolitical Interests

The objective of the first section of the *Special Focus* unit is to encourage students to appreciate the importance of a nation's geopolitical interests in determining foreign policy. Because the U.S.-Soviet relationship is so emotionally charged, it may be helpful to first explore this concept theoretically before applying it to the United States and the Soviet Union.

1. Divide the class into three groups. Each group will represent a different theoretical country with different geopolitical interests. Give each group a list of "givens," such as the following:

**Country A:** You are an island nation over five hundred miles from the nearest continent. For a thousand years you were ruled by a succession of kings. Sixty years ago, however, you overthrew the last monarch and established a democracy. Your economy is capitalist, but barter still flourishes. Your population is a mixture of: (a) island natives, (b) people who immigrated from other islands hundreds of years ago, and (c) immigrants from the nearest mainland country who began to settle on the island in the last sixty years. Intermarriage is common, but everyone is conscious of cultural and racial differences, and problems sometimes arise. Your island has no great mineral wealth and little industrial development. Most of the population's livelihood is dependent upon the ocean.

**Country B:** You are a landlocked nation, surrounded by four foreign countries. In the past thousand years you have been conquered by two of the neighboring nations and incorporated into their territory. However, since your scientists invented a "secret weapon," you have remained free of invasion. In this century your population has grown so rapidly that you are now a nation of crowded cities. Because there is no land available for agriculture, you have developed an active trading relationship with the countries around you, trading your manufactured goods for their agricultural ones. You choose your leaders through open elections in which several competing parties participate. All parties, however, are committed to your socialist economy that provides employment, housing, and educational security for all citizens.

**Country C:** You have existed as an independent nation for only twenty years. Before that you were ruled by a colonial power for eighty years. Your political heritage is a tribal one, however, and tribal loyalties remain strong. Before the colonists arrived, your continent was divided by rival tribes. The colonists established arbitrary "national" boundaries, so now your population is a mixture of three different tribes, although the majority belong to a single tribe. Since your independence, you have had many different leaders, each hoping to establish a stable economy but each being overthrown by a new leader before doing so. You have mineral wealth, but cannot successfully tap it given your current lack of development. As a result many of your people are very poor.

2. Have each group discuss (within the group) what it is like to live in their given country. This will help them develop a "national identity."

3. Have each group consider the following questions and draw up a list of their responses.

A. What is your country's history of foreign invasion? Is your country in danger of being invaded in the near future? Is it likely that your country will choose to invade another country? If so, why?

B. If you believe that your country needs a strong defense to guard against invasion, what type of military capabilities would be most appropriate to your circumstances? Can your country afford to develop such capabilities? If not, what are your alternatives?

C. Does your country face internal political unrest? If so, why? What effect might internal unrest have on your relations with other nations?

D. In what ways does your country benefit from increased contact with other nations? In what ways does increased contact pose dangers?

E. To what extent does your economy depend on resources from other nations? If you depend on such resources and they were withheld from you, what would your options be?

F. How stable is your political system, and how committed are you to defending it?

G. What type of nation might pose a threat to you?

H. With what type of nation might you want to establish a political alliance?

4. Have each group determine a foreign policy based on its responses above, to guide their actions with other countries.

5. Have each group present its foreign policy at an "international" gathering of the class. Have the group explain the basis for its foreign policy and how it relates to their ongoing geopolitical needs.

## Sample Lesson Two: The Geopolitical Interests of the United States and the Soviet Union

Once students have grasped the concept of geopolitical interests, they should be better prepared to apply that concept to the United States and the Soviet Union. Understanding why each country sees the world as it does is a first step to untangling the complex U.S.-Soviet relationship.

1. Have students view the CLOSE UP videotape, "Differing World Views." Then have them read the booklet section, "Differing World Views." You should try to study the unit in subsections—geography and demography, economic systems, and political systems.

2. Divide the class into two groups, one representing the United States, the other, the Soviet Union. Using the information presented in "Differing World Views" as the "givens," each group should discuss its geopolitical interests, and then respond to the questions listed in Sample Lesson One. Each group should share its responses with the other.

Note: Students in the Soviet group should be encouraged to try to view the world as a Soviet policymaker might. Otherwise, the lesson that there are *differing* world views will be lost.



## Sample Lesson Three: Understanding Capitalism and Communism

The objectives of this lesson are: 1) to reinforce the fact that communism and capitalism are economic systems, 2) to explain the fundamental differences between the philosophies of capitalism and communism, and 3) to examine the current economic systems of the United States and the Soviet Union.

1. Have students read "Competing Economic Systems: Capitalism versus Communism" in the *Special Focus* book.

2. The teacher should select passages from Marx's *Das Capital* and Smith's *Wealth of Nations* to illustrate points made in the booklet. You might also wish to select passages from Lenin's *What Is to be Done?*

3. Students should develop a chart illustrating the differences between the philosophies of communism and capitalism. The chart might look something like this:

| | **Capitalism** | **Communism** |
|---|---|---|
| A. ownership of the means of production | | |
| B. distribution of profits | | |
| C. role of government | | |
| D. role of supply and demand | | |

4. Students should develop a chart illustrating the differences between "ideal" communism and the current Soviet economic system and a chart comparing "ideal" capitalism to the current U.S. economic system.

Examples:

| **"Ideal" Communism** | **Soviet Economy** | **"Ideal" Capitalism** | **U.S. Economy** |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. no government | 1. government controls entire economy | 1. no government interference in economy | 1. widespread government regulation |
| 2. distribution of profits according to need | 2. profits distributed according to status and productivity (and sometimes corruption) | 2. prices controlled by supply and demand | 2. prices controlled by many factors other than supply and demand |
| 3. classless society | 3. classes continue to exist based on job status and wage differentials | 3. no limits on foreign trade | 3. restrictive tariffs and quotas |

## Sample Lesson Four: The Political Systems of the United States and the Soviet Union

The objective of this lesson is to give students a basic understanding of decision-making and law-making structures in the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

1. Have students view the portion of the "Differing World Views" videotape that describes the Soviet and U.S. political systems. Then have them read the appropriate section of the book.

2. Divide the class into two sections, one representing the United States, the other, the U.S.S.R. Within each group, students should take the role of actors within the U.S. and Soviet political systems. (Several students can share a role.) Roles may include the following:

**United States**

President
Advisor to the President for National Security Affairs
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Speaker of the House
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Ambassador to the Soviet Union

**Soviet Union**

General Secretary of the Communist Party
Politburo member
Premier
Defense minister
Supreme Soviet delegate
Presidium member
Ambassador to the United States

3. Give each group a foreign policy problem to debate within its political system. Students should try to play their roles realistically, based on the information in the book and videotape. Each group should watch the debate of the other. Examples of foreign policy problems for debate:

- You have just learned that "the other side" is on the brink of developing a weapon for use in space. Should you: a) declare war preemptively while you still have equal military capabilities, b) suggest immediate negotiations to limit the development and deployment of such weapons, c) divert massive economic resources to develop your own space weapon, d) attempt to have such weapons outlawed by the United Nations, or e) a combination of the above?
- You have just learned that fighting has broken out between a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and a member of the Warsaw Pact. Should you: a) open immediate communications with Moscow/Washington, b) send troops to the area, c) demand that your ally cease fighting and relay the dispute to the United Nations, d) threaten to "nuke" the Soviet Union/United States if it does not force its ally to withdraw from the conflict, or e) a combination of the above?

## Sample Lesson Five: Evolution of U.S.-Soviet Relations

The objective of this lesson is to give students a sense of the flow of the U.S.-Soviet relationship since its inception. By plotting and coding major events, students should see patterns emerge.

1. Have the class read *Evolution of U.S.-Soviet Relations* and view the accompanying videotape.

2. Using the blackboard or scroll paper, develop a timeline beginning in 1914 and continuing to the present. Include major developments within each nation as well as events in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Also include world events that influenced both nations, such as World War I, World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, etc.

3. Color code the timeline to indicate the degree of warmth in relations during each period. For instance, periods of extreme hostility might be colored blue, while periods of cooperation and detente might be colored red.

## Sample Lesson Six: Evolution of U.S.-Soviet Relations

History is not a series of static events, but rather, an ever-changing interplay of interrelated perceptions. The objective of this lesson is to illustrate the importance of perception and misperception in U.S.-Soviet relations and, in so doing, to show how differently the relationship might have evolved had either superpower reacted differently to given circumstances.

1. Have the class read the section of the book concerning the evolution of U.S.-Soviet relations, and then have them view the videotape *The Evolution of U.S.-Soviet Relations*. Stop the tape to highlight points at which one nation took specific actions that resulted in a counteraction by the other. Discuss the second nation's probable perception of the original act. How valid was the second nation's perception? On how much information was it based? Did the first nation then react to the second nation's counteraction?

2. Have students each pick a ten-year period of greatest interest to them. Have them write a few paragraphs about U.S.-Soviet relations during this period. (You may wish to have them do additional research on certain periods.) Ask them to note the pivotal actions taken by each nation during that period. For instance, for the period 1945-55, students might write:

- United States: drops atom bombs; meets with Germans and Japanese and establishes friendly relations with recent enemies; forms NATO, an anti-Soviet military alliance; establishes foreign policy of "containment" of Soviet-inspired communism; backs Nationalists against Communists in Chinese civil war; fights Chinese Communists in Korean War.
- Soviet Union: dominates Eastern European nations establishing Communist regimes backed by Soviet military force; establishes blockade of West Berlin; prohibits communication between Eastern European countries (as well as the Soviet Union) and the Western democracies; successfully tests atom bomb; establishes anti-NATO military alliance, the Warsaw Pact.

3. Have each student write a one-page essay describing what might have happened had either side reacted differently to a given event. What role did communication or lack of communication between the superpowers play?

## Sample Lesson Seven: The Arms Race

The objective of this lesson is to have students explore fundamentally different philosophies that exist with respect to a nation's defense. Teachers should supplement the *Special Focus* series with additional readings if possible.

1. Have students read "A Critical Issue: The Arms Race" in the *Special Focus* booklet and view the videotape, "The Arms Race."

2. Divide the class into two groups. One group will prepare to defend the following idea:

- The best guarantee of peace is a strong defense. History shows that nations that allowed themselves to become militarily weak invited invasion. To maintain a strong defense the United States must continue to modernize both its conventional and nuclear forces. To neglect to do so invites instability in the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

The other group will prepare to defend the following idea:

- Nations that prepare for war will eventually fight a war. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have enough weapons to destroy each other many times. That should keep either side from attacking the other. The best way to ensure a stable U.S.-Soviet relationship is through diplomacy, not by devoting billions of dollars to a spiraling arms race.

2. After preparing their arguments, students should debate the opposing ideas.

## Sample Lesson Eight: In Pursuit of Peace

A futures wheel is a model of the possible consequences of an event—any event. By constructing a futures wheel as described below, students will be able to develop logically the many possible outcomes of a world event or interaction between the United States and the Soviet Union. A class discussion about the future of U.S.-Soviet relations should be more clearly focused after students have participated in the exercise.

### How to Construct a Futures Wheel

1. Put the *main event* in a circle in the middle of your paper.

2. Think of as many things as could possibly happen as a *direct* result of the main event. Put these in circles around the main event and attach them to the main event by arrows, like spokes of a wheel. They are called *first generation consequences,* and the more you can think of the better.


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
BETTER

3. Think of any possible results of the consequences you have already written down. If each of the first generation consequences were to happen, what might happen then? These are called *second generation consequences,* and are attached with arrows to the first generation consequences from which they stem.


Second Generation Consequence
First Generation Consequence
MAIN EVENT
First Generation Consequence
Second Generation Consequence

You can go to third, fourth and fifth generation consequences if you like. Remember that the further out you go, the more *indirect* the consequences become.

4. Next, identify which consequences are desirable or undesirable—things you would or would not like to have happen as a result of the main event. Consequences that are considered desirable are marked on the arrows leading to them with a "D." Undesirable consequences are likewise marked with an "Und."



5. Now try to identify consequences as probable or improbable. These are marked in a manner similar to that in Step Four, using either a "P" or an "Imp."





6. Study your futures wheel after you have made it. Write a brief statement about the things you have learned in constructing your futures wheel. Some things to consider are:

- Relationships between events you did not previously think were related.
- What can be done to prevent undesirable but probable consequences.
- What can be done to encourage desirable consequences, particularly if they are not probable.